企業管理dissertation：代理成本和所有權結構的管理行為

1. Introduction
1.1. in thd encomy Environment within the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of householdership structure1 for the firm. along with tying together elements of the idea of eachof those three areas, our researchcasts new gentleon and has implications for a number of issues within the proand dadular literature including the definition of the firm, the “separation of householdership and control,” the “social responsibility” of business, the definition of a “corporate objective function,” the determination of an optimal capital structure, the preciseation of the content of credit agreements, the idea of rganizations, and the sourceside of the entireness of markets problems.
1。介紹
1.1。在本文中，我們得出的理論財產權利（1），（2）機構，以及（3）金融發展的理論在公司內的最新進展。隨著運算這三個領域，我們新的想法元素捆綁在一起，并具有影響的一些問題內文獻，包括該公司的定義，“分離的控制，”“社會責任“的經營，”企業的目標函數的定義，“最佳資本結構的確定，內容的信貸協議，的想法組織行為學的整個市場問題的。

1.2 Theory of the Firm: An Empty Box?
While the literature of economics is replete with references to the “theory of the firm,”the material generally subsumed under that heading is not actually a theory of the firm but rather a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The firm is a “black box” operated so as to meet the relevant marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however, we have no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the individual participants are brought into equilibrium so as to yield this result. The limitations of this black box view of the firm have been cited by Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall, among others. More recently, popular and
professional debates over the “social responsibility” of corporations, the separation of ownership and control, and the rash of reviews of the literature on the “theory of the firm” have evidenced continuing concern with these issues.
1.2企業理論：一個空框？
雖然經濟學的文獻中充斥著“企業理論的引用，”的材料一般歸入該標題是不是實際上是一個企業理論，而是理論的市場中，企業是重要的參與者。該公司是一個“黑箱”操作，以滿足相關的投入和產出的邊際條件，從而實現利潤最大化，或者更準確地說，現值。除了最近的一些試探性步驟，但是，我們有沒有理論解釋如何個別參與者被帶入平衡相互沖突的目標，從而產生這樣的結果的。這個黑盒子的局限性，鑒于公司已被引用的亞當·斯密和阿爾弗雷德·馬歇爾，等等。最近，流行，
專業爭論的“社會責任”的企業，所有權和控制權的分離，而且皮疹文學上的“理論”已經證明這些問題的持續關注公司的評論。

1.3 Property Rights
An independent stream of research with important implications for the theory of the firm has been stimulated by the pioneering work of Coase, and extended by Alchian, Demsetz, and others.5 A comprehensive survey of this literature is given by Furubotn and Pejovich (1972). While the focus of this research has been “property rights”,6 the subject matter encompassed is far broader than that term suggests. What is important for the problems addressed here is that specification of individual rights determines how costs and rewards will be allocated among the participants in any organization. Since the specification of rights is generally affected through contracting (implicit as well as explicit), individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend upon the nature of these contracts. We focus in this paper on the behavioral implications of the property rights specified in the contracts between the owners and managers of the firm.

Note also that agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort (such as the coauthoring of this paper) by two or more people even though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship. Viewed in this light it is clear that our definition of agency costs and their importance
to the theory of the firm bears a close relationship to the problem of shirking and monitoring of team production which Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise in their paper on the theory of the firm. Since the relationship between the stockholders and the managers of a corporation fits the
definition of a pure agency relationship, it should come as no surprise to discover that the issues associated with the “separation of ownership and control” in the modern diffuse ownership corporation are intimately associated with the general problem of agency. We show below that an
explanation of why and how the agency costs generated by the corporate form are born leads to a theory of the ownership (or capital) structure of the firm.

governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency relationships such as those common in the performing arts and the market for real estate. The development of theories to explain the form which agency costs take in each of these situations
(where the contractual relations differ significantly), and how and why they are born will lead to a rich theory of organizations which is now lacking in economics and the social sciences generally. We confine our attention in this paper to only a small part of this general problem—the analysis of agency costs generated by the contractual arrangements between the owners and top management of the corporation.

Conclusions
The publicly held business corporation is an awesome social invention. Millions of individuals voluntarily entrust billions of dollars, francs, pesos, etc. of personal wealth to the care of managers on the basis of a complex set of contracting relationships which delineate the rights of the parties involved. The growth in the use of the corporate form as well as the growth in market value of established corporations suggests that at least, up to the present, creditors and investors have by and large not been disappointed with the results, despite the agency costs inherent in the corporate form.