(TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY)德州農(nóng)工大學(xué)作業(yè)：中國(guó)的全球化、國(guó)家與中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的發(fā)展

Globalization, the state and China’s internet development in China中國(guó)的全球化、國(guó)家與中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)的發(fā)展
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY德州農(nóng)工大學(xué)
Decline or weakening of authoritarian state control has been a central theme in the debate over the economic, political and social consequences of globalization減少或者削弱專制主義國(guó)家控制，已經(jīng)成為關(guān)于經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治和社會(huì)全球化后果爭(zhēng)論的中心問(wèn)題。(see Giddens, 1999; Graham, 1999; Hannerz, 1996; Kluver and Weber, 2003; Long, 1996; Stiglitz, 2003; Weber, 2003). Central to this debate is the relationship between the corresponding rise of transnationalism and profound denationalization in developing countries, particularly in the East Asian region, including China. 這場(chǎng)辯論的核心是，發(fā)展中國(guó)家，特別是東亞的地區(qū)，包括中國(guó)，國(guó)內(nèi)跨國(guó)主義水漲船高和非國(guó)有化的深化之間的關(guān)系。Discussions over the relationship between the state
and the era of globalization usually presumes the following forces: transnational capital flows and internationalized markets; growing information economy;growth in number and scale of transnational corporations; recognition of shared global risk; and treaties and trade agreements that make national borders increasingly porous and thus less relevant (Goldman et al., 2003).國(guó)家和全球化的時(shí)代之間的關(guān)系討論，通常假定下列影響因素：跨國(guó)資本流動(dòng)和國(guó)際化的市場(chǎng)；不斷增長(zhǎng)的信息經(jīng)濟(jì)；跨國(guó)公司數(shù)量和規(guī)模的增長(zhǎng);全球風(fēng)險(xiǎn)共享識(shí)別；使國(guó)家邊界越來(lái)越多多孔，從而減少相關(guān)的條約和貿(mào)易協(xié)定。
This perception of globalization as an overwhelming force that pushes alternate (read non-Western) ideas and practices to the periphery is one perpetuated and sustained through global communication and information networks and the discourse of free trade (Graham, 1999; Stiglitz, 2003).這種把全球化視為一種推動(dòng)外圍替代性（非西方）想法和做法的壓倒性力量的想法，它通過(guò)全球通信和信息網(wǎng)絡(luò)是在還有自由貿(mào)易的話語(yǔ)成為一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期存和持續(xù)的觀念。 However, Giddens (1999) argues that, over time, the notion of globalization has become very much a contested construct that impinges upon and is in turn impinged upon by individual actors and social groups. Accordingly, Hannerz (1996) suggests that the resulting multiplicity of outcomes within this dynamic process is appropriated and contested at the local level by government, business and individuals.This means that ‘globalization, in its many and varied forms, is accompanied by vast social, political, and cultural implications surrounding this dynamic and negotiated transformation’ (Kluver and Weber, 2003: 373).Emerging from this process of negotiation is the simultaneous globalizing and de-globalizing of localities. According to Long (1996), the meaning of globalization is reconciled primarily through localized sets of meanings and practices.Thus, the negotiation of ideologically generated symbols (i.e. global and local), transmitted through information and communication technology (ICTs), become critical to understandings of globalization at the local level(Kluver and Weber, 2003).
Localized responses to the challenges of globalization have been many and varied as governments negotiate the positive aspects of global economic integration and the potentially destabilizing impact on political processes and social stability.面對(duì)全球化地化挑戰(zhàn)的本地化應(yīng)對(duì)有很多，并且隨著政府對(duì)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)一體化的積極方面和潛在的對(duì)政治進(jìn)程和社會(huì)的穩(wěn)定破壞性的評(píng)價(jià)而有所不同。 In turn, governments have become extremely adept at reaffirming themselves as central agencies in a new economic regime, rendering earlier predictions that authoritarian states would wither under the sustained pressure of global economic change far less certain. This reaffirmation by governments, particularly in relation to business and commerce, is seen as a necessary way to protect the integrity of traditional political and social structures while securing the most favorable position possible in a competitive global economic landscape (Weber, 2003).
One of the key factors in the Chinese state sustaining its influence and control within a socialist-market economic structure is the re-positioning of the state-run media as a more effective and responsive contributor to economic development through a process of strategic commercialization. 中國(guó)政府在社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制中維持其影響力和控制力的關(guān)鍵因素之一是對(duì)國(guó)營(yíng)媒體作為通過(guò)戰(zhàn)略商品化的過(guò)程對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展做出更有效和及時(shí)的貢獻(xiàn)的重新定位。Under China’s economic reform, based on the rubric of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’,the government has shifted its thinking on the media from seeing it solely as a propaganda tool to harnessing its commercial potential to deliver(sell) audiences (consumers) to advertisers. Accordingly, Chinese media organizations, often in collaboration with global media companies, produce or import cultural commodities (content) – whether television programs,movies, online games or mobile telephone content – that is calculated to ensure maximum returns on capital investment and expenditure by meeting the needs of an emerging consumer-oriented audience. Such cultural commodities are stamped with the ‘sameness’ for interchangeability across media platforms, which increases profitability within a controlled, media market (Weber and Lu, 2004; Wong, 2001).
This focus on commercialization of the media reflects how China is transforming its broader cultural industries (inclusive of the media) through the process of commodification.這種對(duì)媒體商業(yè)化的關(guān)注，反映了中國(guó)正如何通過(guò)商品化的過(guò)程改變其更廣泛的文化產(chǎn)業(yè)（包括媒體）。 Typically, commodification refers to those processes through which social relations are reduced to an exchange relation (Goldman et al., 2003). However, any discussion of commodification today extends to the cultural economy as it is transformed into a commodity that enhances specific social relations. In the context of new softer authoritarian structures, Wong (2001) suggests that the state continues to exert the most influence over the media in quasi-market economies. In fact, the success of commodification of culture in China is seen by the government as a way of magnifying the types of positive social relations that are not only beneficial but essential for nation-building (guojia jianshe), or the bringing together of peoples by adopting common values and practices (Weber and Lu, 2004; see also Weber, 2003). This process of using the media to reinforce the uniqueness of Chinese values and practices illustrates how the government is challenging the negative aspects of the discourse of globalization upon local political and social structures. Weber (2003) argues that, by supporting a value system that continually evokes the uniqueness of the Chinese race, Confucianism and socialist values, domestic media groups reinforce the notion of an ‘imagined#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
Chinese community’, linked economically to, but separated politically and culturally from, the global world.
Such attempts to reconcile modernity with traditional culture and values limit the influence of western culture upon Chinese society. 這種企圖調(diào)和現(xiàn)代與傳統(tǒng)文化和價(jià)值觀的做法限制了西方文化對(duì)中國(guó)社會(huì)的影響Thus, as China’s civilization is strengthened through cultural flows between culturally sensitive media groups …modern Chinese culture potentially becomes a formidable force at the local level.As differing groups create closer relationships around the government’s discursive constructions of a modern Chinese value system, this localized ‘imagined world’becomes more powerful. (Weber, 2003: 288)
Giddens (1999) argues that, if such imaginings of abstract systems of social relations are to be effective, ‘re-embedding mechanisms’ are critical to their success. In referring to such mechanisms, Giddens (1999: 80) focuses on the processes in which ‘faceless commitments are sustained or transformed by facework’. For Giddens, facework operates within specific interactions between participants in these abstract systems of social relations. As such,people respond to facework of others, which sustains abstract systems through the building of trust (Goldman et al., 2003). Evidence of such trust-building mechanisms within the Chinese context exists in the Chinese Communist Party’s initiatives for ‘reinventing government’ – making it more efficient and more responsive – to assist China’s transition to a market economy (see Stiglitz, 2003). Two key administrative rationalizations within the telecommunications and information infrastructure underpin these initiatives:
1. Development of an information system that is basically transparent, allowing multi-dimensional reports on and data about social and economic problems to flow into responsible state agencies and officials, without being distorted, delayed, or just omitted; and
2. Creation of legally regulated channels through which the ordinary citizen can routinely express their non-political demands for social and economic justice. (Ding, 2002: 212)
To more effectively regulate these channels, the government adopted the‘Public Pledge on Self-discipline for China’s Internet Industry’ in 2002. Within the first six months, the Pledge was signed by over 300 internet service and content providers, including Renmin, Xinhua News Service, Sina, Sohu and NetEase. The Pledge’s aims seem fairly benign as it seeks to aggressively promote internet use, prevent cybercrimes, foster healthy industry competition and avoid intellectual property violations. Such an approach projects an image to the world of a more conscientious government embracing WTO reforms for promoting the commercial use of the internet and achieving greater transparency.As Stiglitz (2003: xii) argues, increased transparency is a necessity for‘improving the information that citizens have about what … institutions do,allowing those who are affected by the policies to have a greater say in their formulation’.However, a closer examination of the Pledge reveals a number of restrictions that could potentially hinder the objective of information flow and civic engagement within the broader public space in China. For example, internet content and service providers are prohibited from ‘posting or disseminating pernicious information that may jeopardize state security and disrupt social stability’.The prohibition also covers information considered illegal such as the spreading of ‘superstition and obscenity’ (Wired, 2002). Accordingly, any reference to the outlawed religious movement Falungong constitutes a breach of the Pledge. More concerning, though, is that signatories must also monitor and remove content on both domestic and foreign-based websites and block those containing ‘harmful information’, such as calls for democratic reform or criticism of government policies, or face expulsion from the group and thus serious financial losses as the internet continues to expand rapidly (Wired, 2002).
Since the Pledge was introduced, the number of websites, domain names and users has increased dramatically. In January 2002, there were 277,100 websites, 127,319 domain names and 33.7 million users (Weber, 2002).Within three years these numbers have almost tripled in each category. China Internet Network Information Center’s (CNNIC) July 2005 report indicates that the number of websites had increased 150 percent to 677,000 during the three-and-half-year period. More telling though is the rise in the number of registered domain names, which rose by 390 percent, while user numbers increased to 103 million, second only to the United States (CNNIC, 2005a).http://www.mythingswp7.com/jsjwl/
According to the July 2005 CNNIC report, entertainment is one of the main drivers of China’s internet development. Entertainment ranked first in Primary goal for accessing the Internet (37.9 percent, ?2.2 percent on the previous six monthly figures) and third in Information mostly acquired (50.9 percent, ??6.3). Internet games continue to be one of the most favored entertainment activities (23.4 percent, ?7.5) with almost one-third of users accessing games from cybercafes (30.8 percent, ?8.8). It is estimated that gamers spend 10.9 hours a week playing online, slightly less than the total user average of 14 hours a week, but showing a decrease on July 2004 figures (?0.8)(CNNIC, 2005a). Responding to these phenomena, the government introduced a new category of Online Gaming into CNNIC’s reporting of internet activity in mid-2003 to track and monitor usage levels. Of most concern for the government has been the lack of education value associated with online gaming with the reasons for playing listed as entertainment (59.9 percent),intelligence training (19 percent), making friends (15.2 percent) and playing professionally (10.8 percent) (CNNIC, 2005b). Such figures reinforce government officials’ concerns over internet gaming eroding public morality (see Ang, 2005).
This concern over social stability, however, is tempered by the potential of online gaming to contribute significantly to the economy. Internet analysts estimate that 22.8 million (?10 percent) Chinese people play online games (Hermida, 2005), generating over US $400 million in revenues in 2004 (see Figure 1). One of the most popular online games in 2004 was World of Warcraft, a multi-player role-playing game, which peaked at 450,000 online participants at one time (Hermida, 2005). As Weber and Lu’s (2004: 9) observation suggests, a visit to a local cybercafe (wangba) shows how popular online gaming has become:
One of the first things a visitor notices is that each computer-filled room is dark and noisy, crowded with hundreds of young, male netizens celebrating their online freedom by playing war games, such as Schroet Commando. These games provide teenage users the space to navigate their way through a battlefield, hunting down and killing enemy soldiers for around 3 yuan (30 euro) an hour during lunch breaks or after school. One well-known story making the rounds is of a university student who spent all his time and money on virtual games. When asked by his parents to find a job, he replied that if there was a job where he could play games, he would
The popularity of online gaming has also contributed to growth across technology platforms, including telecommunications, software development and consumer electronics. For example, mobile gaming has emerged as a growth industry as companies seek to access the 334.8 million Chinese mobile telephone users (Soderberg et al., 2005). Many of these youth use mobile telephones(and the internet) as their primary means of communication (Yardley,2005). Revenues from mobile gaming increased in 2004 to US $298 million,a rise of 48 percent from the previous year. Industry analysts predict that mobile gaming revenues alone will quadruple by 2009 (Nystedt, 2004).
Growth in both online and mobile gaming contributes to further investment in domestic game development, including creation of gaming applications for mobile telephones and expansion of online services and product innovations.While mobile games based on SMS have secured a dominant share in the mobile gaming market in 2003–4, new games designed for the 2.5-generation platforms like WAP, JAVA and BREW (see Table 1) are beginning to show stronger growth as game vendor companies invest more in game production.
Expansion of the online and mobile gaming industries has attracted considerable foreign investment in handset and web portal development for downloads of newer interactive games and other related online services and products.上網(wǎng)和移動(dòng)游戲產(chǎn)業(yè)的擴(kuò)展，已經(jīng)在提供下載新的互動(dòng)游戲和其他相關(guān)的在線服務(wù)和產(chǎn)品的手機(jī)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)門戶發(fā)展方面，吸引了相當(dāng)數(shù)量的外商投資。Traditional mobile telephone suppliers such as Motorola Inc. and Nokia have upgraded handset performance to handle new mobile gaming
functions for the Chinese market (Chen, 2005). Furthermore, domestic internet portal operators NetEase.com, Sohu.com and China.com have attempted to forge cooperative deals on content and web development with global media companies to help develop online services and products to the expanding youth consumer base.