留學(xué)生畢業(yè)dissertation網(wǎng):Is there a democratic deficit in US

Hackett, R.
Is there a democratic deficit in US and UK journalism
Hackett, R., (2005) "Is there a democratic deficit in US and UK journalism" from Allan, Stuart,
Journalism: critical issues pp.85-97, Maidenhead: Open University Press
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Is there a democratic deficit in US and
UK journalism?
Robert A. Hackett
Does journalism in the US and UK adequately serve the needs of a ldemocratic political communication system?
What do different political perspectives have to say on this question?If there is a democratic deficit, what can we do about it?
By framing and directing attention to public issues, journalism has a key rolein contemporary political life, one commonly described as vital to informedcitizenship and accountable government. Many critics, however, argue thateven in established liberal democracies like Britain and the US, journalismis falling short of expectations of how it should function as an agent ofdemocratic rule.
Whether journalism has such a 'democratic deficit7, and why, is thischapter's topic. Positions on these questions vary, for two reasons. First, the
evidence on media performance is not always clear cut. The influences onnews selection, the patterns of news content, and their impact on political 1#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
life, are questions much debated among journalists, politicians, media
scholars and publics. I iMore fundamentally, though, how we evaluate the media's democraticperformance depends greatly on what 'grading7 criteria we use. This chaptersketches contending perspectives on what democracy entails, and what theroles of journalism in contributing to democratic governance ought to be.
http://www.mythingswp7.com/dissertation_writing/Competing conceptions of democracy are not simply matters for 'policywonks'. They are 'weapons' in filndamental political divisions over social andeconomic policy, and alternative futures are ultimately at stake. For instance,the bdsiness sector and some of the affluent middle class favour 'free market'policies of privatization, market reregulation (often called deregulation), ,trade liberalization and the dismantling of the 'welfare state7. Trade unions,progressive social movements and other groups, by contrast, advocate apositive role for the public sector in protecting the environment, labourSupplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
86 Journalism: critical issuesstandards, public services and some measure of social equality. Academics,
political parties, policy institutes and interest groups involved in thesedebates draw upon and develop quite different paradigms of democracy,which in turn imply different normative expectations of journalism. IVe nowturn to these contending perspectives.
I The conservative critique: market liberals andelitist democrats
Since the 1980s, the 'free market' vision of democracy has gained politicaland cultural hegemony. Known variously as market liberalism, neoliberalismor neoconservatism, this ideology holds that 'that government is best
which governs leasty- with the exception that the State's military, police, andprisons are seen as necessary to preserve the social order. Democracy is seen
not as a end in itself but as normally the best institutional arrangement tomaintain political stability and a liberal political culture characterizedby individual rights and choice, particularly econonlic rights of ownership,contract and exchange.
It often adopts a populist and anti-elitist stance, but this 'free market'vision actually fits well with an elitist version of democracy, classically
articulated by Joseph Schumpeter (1976; cited in Baker 2002). His theory of'competitive elitism' (Held 1987, 164-85) meshes with market liberalism'semphasis on private consumption rather than public virtue. Given the com- 1 , lplexity of modern political issues, the vulnerability of the masses to irrationaland emotional appeals, and the risk of overloading the political systemwith competing demands, Schumpeter argued, ongoing public participationis neither necessary nor even desirable. Policy-making elites should befairly autonomous from the mass public; they can be held sufficiently 'accountable through periodic elections, the entrenchment of individual politicalrights (assembly, expression), and a free press. In this view, democracy lis a procedure for selecting leaders, with citizen participation confined#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
mainly to voting every few years - essentially, the role of consumers in apolitical marketplace. .l 1
Journalism in this model would have several roles. By exposing corruptionand the abuse of power, the press should act as a watchdog on government,which is considered the main threat to individual freedom. The press
/ l
l
'need not provide for nor promote people's intelligent political involvement
or reflection', since 'meaningful understanding of social forces and structural
problems is beyond the populace's capacity' (Baker 2002: 133); nor
need it raise fundamental questions about State policy or the social order.
But journalism, particularly the 'quality' press, can usefully report intra-elite ' I
debates and circulate 'objective' information helpful to elites themselves.
This 'elitist' mandate for journalism was articulated as early as the 1920s by
the legendary American political columnist IValter Lippmann (1963). l ;
If free market conservatives see a democratic deficit in contemporary
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Is there a democratic deficit? 87
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journalism, they usually focus on one of two perceived problems. One is the
influence of the State, whether through informal attempts by governing
politicians to manipulate journalists, or through formal laws and regulations,
such as restrictions on media concentration, or 'public service7 content
requirements in broadcasting. Public service broadcasters that receive
licence fees or taxes, like the BBC, come under particular fire from market
liberals, for allegedly being too vulnerable to pressure from the governments
that fund them, eroding its 'watchdog' function. Market liberals regard
commercial, privately owned media as more democratic, shaped as.
they allegedly are by reader, viewer and listener preferences. A commercial
media system, it is argued, gives audiences what they want: the consumer is
'sovereign'.
Conservatives, especially in America, see a second problem with news
media - a pervasive hostility towards mainstream or middle American
authority figures or values, due mainly to the 'left-liberal' political biases of
journalists. Some commentators portray journalists as part of a 'new class'
of bureaucrats and intellectuals with a value system at odds with the
achievement orientation of business and with a vested interest in expanding
State regulation (see, for example, Lichter, Rothman and Lichter 1986;
Hackett and Zhao 1998: 258). In the US, where conservatives continue to
expound the left-liberal bias thesis on radio talk shows and in best-selling
books (for example, Goldberg 2001) it has become almost conventional
wisdom (although it is less so in the UK). A more recent version of the#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
conservative critique sees journalists as holding 'postmaterialist' values, like
feminism or environmentalism, more than the general population (Miljan
and Cooper 2003: 56-9).
Social conservatives (as distinct from market liberals) are angered by
journalism's perceived violations of morality or social order - too much sex,
violence, sensationalism and invasion of privacy. These concerns are politically
important but because they span the political spectrum and are not
easily related to models of democracy I shall not pursue them here.
Conservatives (market liberals) fear that left-liberal and State-regulated
journalism could threaten public support for business, and for the economic
and military policies that (in their view) u?derpin freedom and prosperity.
What solutions flow from their analysis? Deregulate private media and
defund public service broadcasters. Hire more conservative journalists, and/
or subject journalists to more editoriaVowner supervision.
Both of these market liberal critiques rest on very debatable assumptions.
As an explanation of news output, the left-liberal thesis is dangerously
partial and misleading. Its persistence is accounted for not by genuine merit,
but by a generation-long corporate and right-wing 'ideological mobilization'
to undo the impact of the 1960s protest movements, to restore the unchallenged
legitimacy of corporate capitalism, and to reverse the progressive
aspects of the welfare state (Dreier 1982; Hackett and Zhao 1998: 138). The
thesis focuses on journalists as individuals, and downplays their insti-
1
tutionalized routines and pressures (especially from business and the State) !
that in the view of most media sociologists largely determine the shape of l
88 Journalism: critical issues
news (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). Conservative critics offer relatively little
evidence that journalists' presumably liberal attitudes systematically influence
actual news content. Conservatives exaggerate the extent and radicalism
of media attacks on authority, ignoring their selective focus on government
rather than private-sector institutions, and on transgressions that confirm
rather than contradict neoliberal assun~ptions. Government red tape or
taxes ill spent are usually more newsworthy than business corruption or
exploitation (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 138-41).
The second market liberal critique, that media regulation contradicts the
democratic principle of consumer sovereignty, assumes first, that media
audiences are primarily consumers rather than citizens. From a democratic
standpoint, the two concepts are radically different. 'Citizen' implies active
participation in civic affairs; 'consumer' implies the more private and passive
role of material consumption. Citizens in a democratic state are in principle
equal; consumers in a market economy are unequal, because their ability to#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
consume commodities depends upon their purchasing power.
Second, the 'consumer sovereignty' argument does not work even on its
own terms. It conveys an image of unified and determined consumers barking
orders to compliant media corporations, who then produce the programming
that consumers want (Curran 2000: 129-33; Hackett and Zhao
1998: 185-8). In reality though, many structural factors, discussed below,
refract or undermine the expression of consumer preferences in commercial
media content. And even if media could be made as responsive as possible to
consumer preferences, they would not necessarily produce the kind of public
forum and quality news that are a precondition of informed citizenship.
People express their values not only through consumer purchases, but also
through their votes and their taxes; and some valued public goods, like
public health and citizen-oriented journalism, cannot easily be supplied
through market mechanisms. This limitation is relevant though, only if the
goal is participatory rather than elitist democracy.
I 'Public sphere' liberalism f
The elitist model of democracy has been criticized on many grounds. Its I t
i
negative view of citizens' participation is unduly pessimistic; in referenda I
and elections on fundamental issues (like EU membership, or Canada-US
free trade in 1988) citizens have shown a remarkable capacity for learning
and civic engagement. Conversely, scandals such as the apparent manipula- l
tion of security intelligence by the Bush and Blair governments before the
2003 Iraq war, suggest that the elitist model overestimates the competence i I
and accountability of policy makers, in the absence of ongoing public 1 1
participation. I j
Similarly, the related market liberal approach to democracy overlooks
the excessive power of concentrated wealth in policy-making processes. It i I
1 ,
dismisses the threat to political equality and even meaningful individual I t
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Is there a democratic deficit? 89
freedom posed by the growing gap between rich and poor. And it ignores the
erosion, by a culture of acquisitive individualism, of the sense of community
underpinning democratic governance.
. Such considerations have strengthened an alternative vision that accepts
the elitist democrats' support for individual sights and an independent
'\vatchdog' press, but places a much higher value on popular participation
. through established political channels. Participation can be valued as a
means to both produce more just and legitimate policies, and to develop the
democratic capacities of citizens.
Liberal participatory democrats prioritize the role of media in facilitating
or even constituting a public sphere - 'that realm of social life where the#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
exchange of information and views on questions of common concern can
take place so that public opinion can be formed' (Dahlgren 1995: 7). As
theorized by Jiirgen Habermas, the public sphere is not necessarily a physical
setting, but a conceptual space within various venues and groups, one characterized
ideally by discussion free of domination, equality of participation,
and rationality in the sense of an appeal to general principles rather than
sheer self-interest. In a participatory democracy, government policy would
reflect the decisions of a civil society collectively debating and determining
its future. The media would provide an arena of public debate, and reconstitute
private citizens as a public body in the form of public opinion (Curran
1996: 82-3).
In a participatory democracy, what specific roles or tasks are expected of
public sphere-building journalism? Baker (2002: 129-53) advocates two offsetting
types of news media: first, a segmented system that provides each
significant cultural and political group with a forum to articulate and develop
its interests; and second, journalism organizations that can facilitate the
search for society-wide political consensus by being universally accessible,
inclusive (civil, objective, balanced and comprehensive), and thoughtfully
discursive, not simply factual.
Norris (2000: 25-35) proposes a checklist of 'public sphere' tasks for
journalism. If news media are to provide a civic forum that helps sustain
pluralistic political competition, do they provide extensive coverage of politics,
including a platform for a wide plurality of political actors? Do media
provide 'horizontal' communication between political actors, as well as
'vertical' communication between government and governed? Are there multiple
sources of regular political news from different outlets, underpinning
effective government communication, multiple venues for public debate, and
reduced costs to citizens for becoming politically informed? Is there equal or
proportionate coverage of different parties? Finally, as an agent in mobilizing
public participation, does journalism stimulate general interest, public
learning and civic engagement vis-h-vis the political process?
Not only public sphere liberals, but many journalists themselves, would
answer 'no' to many of these questions, especially in the US (for example,
Fallows 1996). The view that media are failing their democratic responsibilities
- a 'media malaise' thesis - has become almost an orthodoxy. As :
Norris (2000: 4-12) summarizes it, the thesis blames journalism for many
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90 Journalism: critical issues
perceived negative trends since the 1970s. Political participation and civic
engagement, indicated by voter turnout rates, are on the decline. Citizens#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
have become more cynical about politics and less trusting in government;
conversely, political leaders have lost credibility, and official political agendas
are less connected to the concerns of ordinary people. Public political discourse
has become 'dumbed down', and public learning about politics
has eroded, as scandal-mongering and personality-oriented fluff replaces
substantive news about political issues. Single-issue interest groups have displaced
political parties as mediating forces, undermining societal-wide civic,
and civil, dialogue.
What lies behind this putative malaise of democracy? Malaise theorists
find some of the causes in the political environment - the fragmentation of
social consensus associated with environmental, economic and other divisive
new issues; voters' weakening allegiance to political parties; the professionalization,
'marketization' and image-orientation of political campaigns
(Blumler and Gurevitch 1995: 206). But fingers are also pointed at journalism's
own practices, and to a lesser extent, its structures. Economic pressures
are producing a downmarket shift in political journalism towards tabloidization
and infotainment, as has the emergence in the 1970s of network television
as the dominant news medium in the US, followed in the 1980s by
deregulation of private broadcasting in the US, and governmental attacks
on the independence and resources of public service broadcasting in the
UK. The fragmentation of media audiences as channels proliferate has
undermined the cohesion of the public sphere, and facilitated a politics of
division. Journalists' struggle for autonomy from politicians' 'spin doctors'
has led them to adopt a semi-adversarial stance towards government (and
here there is some overlap with the market liberals' critique), and to focus on
the strategies of politicians, rather than the substance of policies.
The perceived 'crisis of public communication' (Blumler and Gurevitch
1995) has led to modest efforts at reforming journalism practices, if not
structures. One example is the public journalism movement in the US,
involving experiments by newspapers to facilitate community discussion of
public issues, rather than simply to report on official sources (Baker 2002:
158-63). In recent years, though, some pyblic sphere liberals have launched
a three-pronged counter-attack to these 'narratives of decline' (McNair
2000: 197).
First, they suggest, the pessimistic reading of news media's changing
structure and political impact is one-sided or lacks supporting evidence.
Market forces do not lead only to downmarket sleaze and the decline of
traditional political news in newspapers, argues McNair (2000: 202, 208);
they can also create incentives to invest in quality journalism, and they have
helped expand the styles and formats of political information in broadcasting#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
and the Internet. And far from engendering cynicism, ignorance and
disengagement, Norris (2000: 318) finds that 'exposure' to news media, and
trustlparticipation in the political system, are mutually reinforcing, thus
constituting a 'virtuous circle'.
A second 'optimistic' line of reasoning acknowledges some of the trends
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Is there a democratic deficit? 91
identified by the pessimists, but re-evaluates them as harmless or even beneficial
to democracy. Tabloid journalism is not a straightforward deterioration
of quality, but has in certain senses popularized political culture, democratized
news agendas, and even constituted 'sites of popular opposition to the
dominant order' - by highlighting the abuses of privilege or the once-closeted
foibles of the powerful, for example (Sparks 2000; McNair 2000; Connell
1992). Politics-as-game journalism is a reasonable adaptation to manipulation
by political spin doctors, and lends more transparency to the political
process; and given their insider knowledge, the media pundits who are
elbowing out politicians and traditional journalists may deserve their celebrity
status (McNair 2000). Such optimistic re-evalution is reinforced by suggestions
to moderate our expectations ofjournalism; thus Norris (2002: 208,
21 1, 227) argues that voters do not need broad civics knowledge, just sufficient
context-specific information to enable them to assess the consequences
of their political choices.
Finally, while the 'optimists' deny a general crisis of democracy in the
US or UK, they do concede that there are significant challenges, such as low
voter turnout or big money's influence in American elections. But they argue
that journalism should not be blamed for flaws rooted elsewhere in power
relations and social structure (Norris 2000: 319) - a consideration which
leads to a third tradition of media critique.
I Radical democracy and the political economy critique
The public sphere liberals' critique is vulnerable to refutation partly because
it is a limited one; it seeks to reform the practices ofjournalism but does not
raise fundamental questions about the market-oriented corporate structures
of news media, and still less the social and political order. By contrast,
radical democrats offer a more robust set of benchmarks for evaluating
media performance. If market liberals emphasize individual liberties and
restrictions on government power, and public sphere liberals highlight public
deliberation about policy, radical democrafs add a third dimension - a thoroughgoing
view of democracy as not just a set of procedural rules, but a
societal environment which nourishes developmental power - everyone's
equal right to 'the full development and use' of their capabilities (Macpherson#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
1977: 1 14; Downing et al. 2001: 434).
Such a standpoint transcends public sphere liberalism in several
respects. First, radical democrats seek not just to reinvigorate the existing
system of representative democracy, but to move beyond it towards direct
citizen participation in decision-making in the neighbourhood, workplace,
and family and gender relations - the lifeworld.
Second, they prioritize equality as a core principle of democracy,
one increasingly undermined by neoliberal governments in the US, UK
and Canada since the 1980s. Citizens should have not only equal legal and
political rights, but also approximate equality in wealth and power.
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92 Journalism: critical issues
Third, radical democrats regard power relations as antagonistic in societies
with structured inequalities; even in prosperous capitalist democracies,
political and economic elites may have interests which conflict with those of
the rest of the population.
Fourth, drawing from the tradition of critical political economy, radical
democrats analyse power holistically. A democratic public sphere cannot be
insulated from power hierarchies embedded in State, economy, gender and
race; so long as they exist, they will tend to undermine equality of voice in
the public sphere.
Finally, given these and other assumptions, radical democrats are often
quite critical of unregulated corporate capitalism and its impact on politics,
society and the environment.
Given this view of democracy, what political roles are expected of news
media? Radical democrats endorse the watchdog and public sphere functions
celebrated in the other models respectively, but add such criteria as
these:
Enabling horizontal con~munication between subordinate groups, I
including social movements as agents of democratic renewal (Angus
2001). By giving public voice to civil society, media can facilitate needed
social change, power diffusion and popular mobilization against social
injustices.
Expanding the scope of public awareness and political choice by reporting
events and voices which are socially important but outside, or even
opposed to, the agendas of elites. Such issues include environmental
sustainability and other extra-market values integral to a just and 1
humane society. I !
Counter-acting power inequalities found in other spheres of the social z
1 order. As McChesney (1999: 288) has put it, 'unless communication and
information are biased toward equality, they tend to enhance social
l
II
inequality'. C
Given these criteria, radical democrats find much to criticize. Whereas
public sphere liberals worry about public mistrust of government, radical
democrats like Herman and Chomsky (1988) worry that media are#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
altogether too successful in 'manufacturing consent' for unjust State and i
r'
corporate policies, while marginalizing dissenters and ordinary citizens from !
political debate. Many aspects of the structure of news media industries
contradict democratic equality and informed participatory citizenship. The
links between media owners and the rest of the business elite (through social
interaction and intercorporate directorships), the disproportionate political
power of corporate-financed advocacy groups both as sources for journalists
and as pressures on newsroom managers, and the political biases
and interests of major media owners like Rupert Murdoch, are all factors l I
that skew journalism towards the political right. High entry costs and oligopoly
(the small number of competitors) in most media markets; the grow- i
ing regional and national concentration of ownership in newspaper and I
L
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Is there a democratic deficit? 93
broadcasting industries; the technological and ownership convergence
between these once separate industries; the rationalization of news gathering
resources within newspaper chains; the brand-name recognition, economies
of scale, access to distribution networks, and the cross-promotional strategies
of large media corporations - all potentially threaten meaningful
diversity of perspective in the journalism of dominant media (Hackett
2001).
News organizations increasingly belong to transnational conglomerates,
companies with a range of holdings in different media and industries.
Shareholders and large merger-fuelled debt loads often drive conglomerates
to maximize short-term profits. The consequences for journalism, which
typically comprises only a fraction of conglomerate revenues, can be severe.
The economic incentive is not to nurture 'serious' journalism, but to provide
a diet of infotainment as the cheapest, safest way to grab audiences. Conflicts
of interest bedevil news judgement, as journalists may feel pressured to
promote or suppress stories about the conglomerate's empire. Alternative
views and products are pushed to the margins, as conglomerates recycle the
same expensively produced brand-name fare through various formats and
channels. Newsroom culture shifts from an ethos of public service, as
journalists are asked to become corporate team players. The controversial
promotion by the Los Augeles Tirlles of the Staples Center, a sports complex
in which its parent company had a financial stake, is an example of several
of these dangers.
In theory, government legislation (such as anti-trust law and broadcasting
statutes), along with regulatory agencies like the US Federal Communications,
are supposed to protect the public interest, especially with respect to#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
broadcasting. In practice, critics argue, the relationship between the State
and big media corporations is symbiotic, indeed almost corrupt
(McChesney 1999); crudely put, politicians want favourable publicity and
media companies want regulatory and legislative favours.
The potentially anti-democratic implications of advertising for journalism
deserve special consideration because economically, the commercial
media's bread is buttered not by audiences primarily, but by advertisers who
pay for access to audiences of the right kin:. Baker (1994: 69-70) identifies
four predictable consequences for journalism. First, advertising discourages
'media accounts of inadequacies or dangers of advertisers' products,
exposis of wrongdoing by advertisers, and serious critiques of those aspects
of the social world on which advertisers depend'. Second, advertising
encourages political blandness over partisan positions on controversial
issues, because advertisers seek to reach maximum audiences and avoid
offending potential purchasers. Third, in order to promote a buying mood,
advertising favours 'lighter material' over critical thought or attention to
social problems - or values like environmentalism, which contradict the
ethos of consumerism. Finally, because advertisers particularly want to
reach people able and willing to buy their products, the media tend 'to adopt
the perspectives and to serve the informational and entertainment needs of
the comparatively afluent'.
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94 Journalism: critical issues
This last point has particular implications for democratic equality.
Affluent consumers have disproportionate influence regarding what kinds of
media outlets and content will flourish economically, and which ones will die
(Hackett 2001). Such inegalitarian biases are not likely to be corrected
through market forces. If the critical political economists are right, the market
is more the problem than the solution. Nor can we count on the muchtouted
Internet to provide a more egalitarian communication network. For
all its democratic and interactive potential, the Internet, under current policy
directions in the US and UK, is becoming colonized by the same commercial
logic and corporate giants Cjoined by telccomrnunications and computer
conglomerates as well) that dominate the traditional information media
(McChesney 1999, Chapter 3; Hackett and Zhao 1998: 190-200).
If the proof is in the eating of the pudding, what are the implications of
these structural features for news content? One useful approach to this question
considers what is not in the news. Each year in the US, Project Censored
lists important and seemingly newsworthy stories that are virtually ignored
by the corporate media. Its top stories for 2003 included the hidden agendas#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
behind the US government's attack on Iraq, the threat to civil liberties from
homeland security measures, a Pentagon plan to actually provoke terrorist
actions in order to enable a counterattack, the Bush administration's largely
covert campaign to undermine labour unions and worker protections, and
increasing monopoly control over the Internet (Phillips and Project Censored
2004). Such stories bespeak a lack of investigative journalism in US
media, and a failure of the 'watchdog' function vis-his corporate and State
power. Conversely, at least in the crucial period leading up to the March
2003 invasion of Iraq, US corporate media, particularly the television networks
spearheaded by Rupert Murdoch's Fox Network, arguably beat the
drums for war. For instance, they amplified the Bush administration's
(highly dubious) claims about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction,
and highlighted Saddam's atrocities against Kurds in the 1980s, while
virtually ignoring US (and British) support for his regime at that time
(Rampton and Stauber 2003).
A related project found similar blind spots in Canada's press during the
1990s, including poverty and inequality, Canada's involvement in global
militarism, religion and traditional social values, the power of the public
relations industry, most news about labour apart from disruptive strikes, the
vested interests of media companies themselves, and white-collar and
corporate crime (Hackett and Gruneau et al. 2000, Chapters 6 and 7).
I Towards media democracy?
The analysis above indicates a democratic deficit in Anglo-American journalism,
vis-his both equality and the watchdog function. To be sure, the
deficit is arguably greater in American mass media, dominated by corporateowned
monopoly metropolitan dailies, and by commercial broadcasters who
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Is there a democratic deficit? 95
have largely abandoned the public service ethos; the UK still has a strong
public service broadcasting tradition and a certain (though conservativeweighted)
diversity in its national press. The public sphere and radical
democratic critiques suggest though, that both countries need to nurture a
more effectively democratic media system. 'Fixing' the democratic deficit
requires addressing not just journalistic practices and ethics but also the
institutional structures within which journalism is practised.
What should be the object of such media reform? No single type of news
organization or journalism can serve all democratic purposes. The news
system needs to be structurally pluralistic, with different types and sectors of
media offsetting each other's limitations. Curran (2000) suggests a five-sector
media system anchored on public service media, which can comprise a public#p#分頁(yè)標(biāo)題#e#
sphere and offset the structural biases of advertising; but it also includes
con~mercial media, which are relatively effective at providing audiencepleasing
entertainment, and communityladvocacy media, which enable civic
groups to speak for themselves.
Such pluralism requires regulatory and legislative initiatives, such as
subsidies and media ownership ceilings because, left to themselves, commercial
pressures will generally deepen rather than reduce the undemocratic
aspects discussed in this chapter. But fearful of antagonizing media corporations
and often politically 'in bed' with them, governments are unlikely to
enact democratic media reform without strong pressure from an organized
coalition within civil society. As they have the most robust critique of
media, radical democrats are likely to be in the forefront of a reform coalition.
They also have the most uphill battle, because their challenge is not
only to specific journalistic practices, but to corporate power and market
logic more broadly.
Nevertheless, there may be openings to move towards their vision,
including alliances with groups within the other two traditions. Most obviously,
radical democrats and public-sphere liberals share an interest in
defending public service broadcasting. And while they will often be on
opposing sides, 'honest' market liberals have reason to work with progressives
on issues of competition, consumer choice and the press's watchdog
role, given the realities of corporate media domination. This possibility is
not just hypothetical. In 2003, right-wing groups joined with progressives in
an unprecedented upsurge of media activism against the regulatory raising
of American media concentration limits. Groups like Free Press in the US
and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom in Britain may be in \ the forefront of renewed struggles for a democratic public sphere in the
twenty-first century.
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