留學生dissertation網(wǎng):Ownership, organization and cultural work

Hesmondhalgh, D.
Ownership, organization and cultural work
Hesmondhalgh, D., (2008) "Ownership, organization and cultural work" from Ryan, Michael, Cultural
studies : an anthology pp.24-42, Oxford: Blackwell
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Ownership, Organisation,
and Cultural Work
Changes in government policy created a new business environment for culturalindustrycorporations, for cultural workers, and for consumers from the late 1980sonwards. In short, marketisation helped to create a situation in which the culturalindustries became an increasingly important sector for business investment. In responseto the Long Downturn of the 1970s and 198Os, private corporations in the advanced .industrial world began to intensify the longer-term shift in investment away fromextractive and transformative sectors, and towards service industries, including thecultural industries. But at the same time, businesses of all kinds were going through along phase of organisational innovation and restructuring. How did these changes affectthe cultural industries?
The first part of the chapter provides evidence of the considerable growth in sizeand scope of large cultural-industry corporations. It examines trends in the strategies#p#分頁標題#e#
of these corporations, including conglomeration and vertical integration. \\'hat havebeen the effects of the growth in size and power of the largest cultural-industry corporationson cultural production and on society?
Changes in ownership and corporate strategy tell us only a certain amount about theenvironments in which creative work takes place, about the nay in which cultural
industry owners and esecutives attempt the difficult business of managing and marketingcreativity. Even in the complex professional era, as large corporations began todominate cultural production, much cultural work was ne\-ertheless based on a certainamount of operational autonomy for creative workers and managers. So in the secondpart of the chapter, I turn to questions of organisation and control. To what estent erethorganisationafeatures associated with the complex professional era of culturalproduction radically altered? Here I address the question: have the rewards and workingconditions of symbol creators - and indeed other workers in the cultural industries -improved during this time? To what extent has creative autonomy been expanded ordiminished over the last 20 years? \\'hat changes have there been in the estent to whichcreative xorkers within the cultural industries get to determine how their work will beedited, promoted, circulated?
*Pp. 134-54 from D. Hesmondhalp, Tlre Cultural Ind~~srri(eLs ondon, Sage Publications). O 2002 by Dayid
Ilesmondhalgh. Reprinted ~ ~ ipterhm ission from the author and Sage Publications Ltd.
Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"O\\?nership and Corporate Structure: The Big Get BiggerOne of the most important transitions from the market professional era of culturalprociuction to the complex professional era involved the increasing presence of largein cultural markets. This trend has intensified in the 1980s and 1990s.There has been a massive growth in the size and scope of cultural-industry corporations.
A small number of transnational corporations have enormous power. I will begin byoutlining the growth and current scope of these corporations before dealing in moredetail ~vitll two vital aspects of corporate strategy - conglomeration and integration -and how these strategies have changed over the last 20 years.The growth in size and the conglomeration of cultural-industry companies werepart of a long-term trend in mergers and acquisitions in all industries that quickenedduring the 1980s in response to the Long Donmturn. There n-ere 4,900 mergers inthe USA betiveen 1968 and 1973, and this number increased in the 1970s and 1980s.'I'here n-ere over 3,300 corporate acquisitions in 1986 alone (Greco, 1995: 229-30).This was the period of marketisation in US broadcasting policy and two of the threegreat US broadcasting net~vorks (CBS and NBC) changed hands in huge deals in1985-6.
Following the Wall Street Crash of October 1987, the US House of Representativeseliminated certain tax breaks that encouraged acquisitions; as a result, mergers of allkinds substantially decreased in the USA in the folloiving years (Greco, 1995: 230)though this move did not put an end to spectacular international mergers. Consumerelectronics company Sony purchased CBS Records in 1988 (USS2 billion) andColumbia Pictures Entertainment (USS3.4 billion) in 1989. Time-Life and \ITarnerCommunications merged in 1989, in the form of a 'friendly' USS14.9 billion buy-outby Time-Life. Then, after the brief hiatus of the late 1980s, the 1990s saw a huge esplosionof mergers in industry as a whole. For example, 1997 saw the highest ever figuresfor US mergers and acquisitions up to that point: USS912 billion worth of deals(B~lsitzessll 'eek, 30 March 1998: 47). This was echoed in the cultural industries. Accordingto Greco (1996: 5), thcrc were 557 reported media business acquisitions betiveen1990 and 1995, only just short of the entire total of such deals betiveen 1960 and 1989.#p#分頁標題#e#
Particularly significant have been two waves of mega-acquisitions, in 1994-5 and in999-2000. See Table 2.1 for details of other major cultural-industry mergers and
acquisitions in the 1990s.
There is another important contest for the growth of cultural-industry corporationsin the late 1990s. The US economy began to boom from 1995 onwards; finally, the
Long Downturn seemed to be in reverse. There was rapid growth of gross domesticproduct, labour productivity and investment. Even real wages went up. This boom ledto what Robert Brenner (2000: 5) has called 'the greatest financial bubble in Americanhistory', as equity prices lost touch with reality, and household, corporate and financialdebt all reached record levels, leading to an esplosion of consumption. As a result ofthe boom, and of mergers and acquisitions in the cultural industries, a situation hadarisen by the late 1990s whereby a small group of corporations were clear leaders interms of the revenues they gained from global cultural-industry markets.Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
Table 2.1 Some major cultural-industry mergers and acquisitionsl'ricerlcquircd firm (new USS
Date Acquiring firnm name in brackets) billions* Strategic motivation
1994 I'iacom Paramount Comms* 8.0 Conglomeration across
publishing, film,
broadcasting, cable, theme
parks
1994 Viacom Blockbuster 8.5 Distribution control
1995 Disney Capital Citics/ADC 19 \Tcrtical integration and control
of content creation
1995 Time \\'amer Turner Broadcasting 7.4 ITcrtical integration and
cong-lomeration/s)-nergy
1995 Seagram hlCA (Universal) 5.7 General conglomerate moves
into diversified media
- 1995 \Yestinghouse CBS 5.4 General conglomerate moves
into broadcasting
1998 AT&T** TCI (including Liberty 4SX** Telccoms-media convergence
AIedia)*
1998 Seagram Poly Gram 10.6 Recording market share plus
Europcan film interests
1999 Carlton** United* 8.0*** AIergcr of major European
metfia groups
1999 Viacom CBS 22 AIedia conglomcratc
consolidates broadcasting
power
2000 irivendi Seagram/Univcrsal 3 5 \'cry diversified European
leisure conglomcrate
diversifies further
2000 AOLS* Time-\\'arner** (AOI, 128*** Internet service provider
Time-\lrarner) merges with media
conplomerate
hrotes: * Prices and values are based on rcports at the time that the merger or acquisition was
announced, esccpt for rlOL Time-\Irarncr, which was evaluated at USS350 billion in January
2000, when the merger was first reported, but at USS128 billion, when the merger was finally
approved by the US regulatory body, the Federal Communications Commission. The fall in
valuc reflectcd the fall in share values over the year, as intcrnet and new media hype subsided.
** indicates a merger.
*** indicates evaluation of new merged company rather than price.#p#分頁標題#e#
Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
.
The Big Six:
AOL Time-\\'arner
\17alt Disney
ITiaconl
\Tivendi Universal
nertelsmann
Netvs Corp.
The names and organisational structures of these companies change regularly,
as further mergers, acquisitions and sell-offs take place, or are put on hold by
regulators.
J?elon- the first tier of sis vast cultural-industry corporations listed, each with annual
re\,enues of over USSlO billion, sits a 'second tier' (Herman and AqcChesney, 1997: 53)
of regional giants, consisting in 1999 and 2000 of 42 companies nit11 revenues in excess
of one billion dollars per year from media and cultural operations. Apart from three
Latin American companies and one Australian concern, all are based in either North
America, Europe or Japan. Some of these companies have ambitions to join the elite
club of cultural-industry mega-corporations, such as Comcast (US, primarily cable) and
German group Kirch. Collectively, the Big 48 have an enormous impact on the culturalindustry
landscape, in terms of policy lobbying, and in terms of the standards they set
for \\.hat constitutes standard practice in the cultural industries. Concentrating only on
the largest sis corporations can distract attention from the huge importance of these 48
corporations. It is the Big 48 we should focus on to get a real sense of the expanded
role of large corporations within the cultural industries.
Even below these two tiers of global giants, there are many other companies, exerting
a sizeable influence on particular markets. A report by Zenith consultants (cited by
Sinchez-Tabernero et al., 1993: 100) usefully classifies the biggest cultural-industry
conlpanies into the folloiving categories:
Companies dominant in one cultural industry in one country
Companies influencing one cultural industry across several countries
Companies having interests across more than one cultural industry in one country
Companies with interests in more than one cultural industry internationally.
Nearly all the cultural-industry corporations in the Big 48 are in one or more of the
first three categories. \ITith conglomeration and internationalisation, more and more
companies are entering, or moving into, the final category.
How Central Are the Cultural Industries in Global Business?
The figures involved in mergers and acquisitions, and the non. massive size of revenues
accruing to the biggest cultural-industry companies, reflect the increasing centrality of
the cultural industries in global business. Ho~vever, \ve should not make the leap made
L Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
bp some commentators (e.g., Lash and Urry, 1994: Chapter 5) and suggest that the
cultural industries form a 'new core' to global business. Cultural-industry corporations#p#分頁標題#e#
are becoming much bigger, but they still have a long nay to go to match the largest
corporations in the world.
In terms of market valuation, the AOL-ll'arner deal of 2000 was the biggest merger
of any kind of all time. Surely this is evidence that converged media and computer companies
represent a new core? In fact, such figures need to be interpreted carefully. The
size ofthe AOL-llrarner deal is closer to the hugely-inflated telecommunications mergers
of the late 1990s which took place in the wake of the pro-convergence 1996 Telecommunications
Act. And even in the new climate of the 1990s, following pears of spectacular
internal growth and mergers, corporations primarily based on cultural-industry business
were still dwarfed in terms of the most relevant indicators by other kinds of corporation.
Table 2.2 shoivs the biggest corporations with significant cultural-industry interests,
along with their rank in the Fortune magazine list of the biggest 500 companics in the
world by revenue in the year 2000. As is clear from the table, even the very biggest cultural-
industry corporations - that is, corporations that gain most of their revenues from
cultural-industry operations - are dwarfed by the biggest corporations in the world.
These corporations are automobile giants (Ghl, number three in the 2001 Global 500;
Ford, number four and Daimler-Chrpsler five, Topota at ten), oil companies such as
Exxon hlobil (number one) and Royal Dutch/Shell (six) and BP (seven), retail giants
(Wal-hlart, at two) and general conglon~erates( Mitsui, at eleven).
These figures should put into perspective the growth of the largcst cultural-industry
corporations.' It may be that in the wake of convergence hype, cultural-industry companies
will merge into vast telecommunications conglomerates - as was the case with
AT&T's media holdings, for example - or even internet service providers (such as
AOL). But these trends have not yet been established firmly enough to warrant the
description 'convergence'. llThat is more, even where such mergers and acquisitions
take place, cultural-industry corporations will operate as separate divisions, just as they
already do now, within vast consumer-electronic corporations (Sony) and general conglomerates
(Vivendi).
Nevertheless, \ve should not forget the essential fact: the increasing presence of vast
companics in the cultural industries. This has important implications. These corporations
are able to mobilise massive lobbying powers and can put tremendous pressure
on governments not to put into place legislation and regulation nhich goes against their
interests as profit-making companies. This often works against the public interest. The
. growth of large corporations also affects prevailing conceptions of how to carry out the
management of creativity. The biggest firms often tend to be the most prestigious, and#p#分頁標題#e#
set the standard by which other businesses carry out their work, with important implications
for conditions of cultural work.
Changing Strategies 1: Conglomeration
An important feature of the comples professional era from the 1960s onwards was
conglomeration. This has continued into the 19SOs and 1990s but corporate strategy
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Table 2.2 The largest corporations ~vithc ultural-industry interests
Revenue in US$
ank king Company billions
1 Esxon AIobil 210.4
(No media interests - included for sake of comparison.)
8 General Electric 129.9
This extremely diverse conglomerate owns the US TV
network NBC, but this is only one of 21 divisions.
30 Sony 66.1
Has five main divisions: consumer electronics, games, music
(Sony AIusic Entertainment), films (Columbia Tristar),
and insurance. Consumer electronics accounts for most of
its sales.
91 lrivendi 38.6
Based in France, centres its business on 'environmental
services', such as water, energy, ~vastem anagement,
transport, construction and property. Prior to its purchase
of Universal Alusic Group from Seagram (1999 revenues:
USS11.784 billion, 418th in Global 500), its oivnership of
Canal Plus made it one of the most important players in
the European media market. The acquisition gives it the
biggest music company in the ~vorldp lus Universal's film
- interests, but its other interests still considerably outweigh
its media concerns.
(103) AOL Titlte IVar~lcr
The biggest cultural-industry corporation in the world, when
this is defined as a corporation where most of the revenues
come from cultural-industry concerns. The merger was
completed in early 2001. Because the merger was
underway throughout 2000, the company is not listed in
the 2001 Global 500, but its combined revenues would put
it at 103rd on the list.
174 Ir'alt Disr~ey
20 1 AIicrosoft
Included for the sake of comparison here. It is building up
many alliances with cultural-industry companies. \llhile it
is one of the most highly-valued companies in the \vorld,
and has very high profit returns on its revenues, it is
important to realise that its revenues are still d\varfed by
older corporations.
245 1% COIIJ
299 Uertels~~~atrn
371 ~\lems Corporation
Note that this ranking underestimates the influence of News
Corporation mogul, Rupert Alurdoch. Another company
of which he has main control, BSkyB, is a major plaj-er in
European digital and satellite television, but reports its
figures separately (ranking 24th on the Variety 50, with
USS3.2 billion of revenue for 2000).
Arotes: italics indicate that most of the company's revenues come from cultural-industry
interests.#p#分頁標題#e#
Sonrce: The Fortlrtte Global 500 list for 2001, based on annual reports 2000/2001.
3 Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
30 Dnzqid Hest~rottc!hnlgh I
with regard to conglomeration has changed in important Ivays. The recent fashion i I
has generally been to build a portfolio of relnterl industries, whereas in the 1960s and il
i 1970s the trend was for non-cultural-industry conglomerates to buy into the cultural 1,
industries.
One of the ways in which the Long Downturn of the 1970s and 1980s forced a
rethinking of the way businesses operated was that there was an increasing emphasis on
i
the notion of 'synergy'. This was originally a medical term: it referred to the nay that
two elements (such as two drugs, or two n~uscles) might work together to produce a
result greater than the sum of the two parts. The idea behind the metaphor was that
the different parts of a corporation should relate to each other in such a manner as to
I
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provide cross-promotion and cross-selling opportunities, so that sales ~vould esceed
what was possible from two separate divisions. AS the popularity of such ideas spread
from business schools and management gurus and into corporations, conglomerates
I
began to specialise again, but not on one activity, as in the pre-diversification era of the
early twentieth century, but on a set of related ones2
l
The form of conglomeration that received the most publicity in the late 1980s was
the purchase of media producers by consumer electronics companies: so-called hard-
~vare/soft\vare ~ ~ n e r g Syo.n~y' s purchases of CBS Records and Columbia Pictures
Entertainment in 1988 and 1989 respectively 1vere widely assumed to represent the
future shape of cultural-industry corporations. The idea was that Sony \vould be able
to use prestigious American rock music and cinema to help persuade consumers to buy
new consumer technologies, such as the mini-disc. Other significant purchases in the
late 1980s were based on very different strategies, such as general conglomerate General
Electric's purchase of NBC. However, it was the acquisitions by Japanese corporations,
such as the Japanese conglomerate 3Iatsushita's acquisition of hlCA Records in 1990,
which received most attention: they fed recession-fuelled fears on the part of US businesses
about a loss of global economic domination.
But by the mid-l990s, such hardnarc/soft~vare synergies were widely vie\ved as a
f;?ilure. Some commentators have esplained this apparent failure by referring to the
different production cultures needed to produce consumer electronics on the one hand,
and music/films/TV programmes on the other. Some of these accounts are convincing
(Negus, 1997) but some press versions of this view bordered on racism: the implication
was that the Japanese \\-ere incapable of producing entertainment; they could only#p#分頁標題#e#
produce efficient machines. \\'hen hardnare/softnare mergers .were deemed to be a
failure, the electronics companies began to sell off their media properties, and to form
alliances and joint ventures with media producers on particular projects.
There is no fundamental reason why mergers, as opposed to alliances and joint ventures,
between electronics companies and media producers will not return to fashion.
But the 1990s were dominated by three more tenacious forms of synergy-based culturalindustry
conglomerate. (The follo~vingty pology is adapted from a study by consultants
Booz, Allen S. Hamilton, summarised by Srinchez-Tabernero et al., 1993: 94.) The first
was the media co~lglotnerare,b ased almost entirely around a set of core media interests
(for esample, News Corporation). The media are also important for the second category,
the leisure cotlglotrrei~ateb, ut take their place alongside other leisure interests, such as
hotels and theme parks (for esample, Disney). From the mid-1990s onwards, ho~vever,
Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
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a type of cultural-industry conglomerate was becoming increasingly significant as
a potential model: the itlfnrtt~ntiotr/cowrz~lrr~icatiocrorr poratiot~( perhaps best symbolised
bv i \ ~ & T ' s 1998 takeover of cable group TCI, including the Liberty AlIedia Group).
hIcdia, tclecon~municationsa nd computer corporations have been merging and acqniring
each other, in anticipation of further con\-ergence between these markets.
The marketisation of broadcasting has been absolutely crucial in the formation of all
three types of conglomerate. For marketisation meant that many new cultural-industry
sectors, including radio, plus terrestrial, cable, satellite and digital television, became
available as targets of purchase and investment for conglomerates wishing to estend
their portfolios, as governments removed restrictions on market concentration and
cross-media ownership and as the cultural industries therefore came to be perceived as
major new growth areas for business.
Conglomeration clearly entails an increase in the scope and po\ver of individual cultural-
industry corporations, in that the same corporation can have stakes in manr different
forms of communication. Fciver companies therefore come to dominate the
cultural industries as a whole. This has an effect on the lobbying po\ver of the corporations,#p#分頁標題#e#
and on their general influence on the way in which cultural production is carried
out. Internal dissent amongst the major conglon~eratesi s less likely, as they decrease in
number. It undoubtedly allows the corporations to cross-promote their products
(whether tests or other commodities). This in turn reinforces the poncr of the oligopolies
dominating the cultural industries. Some also assert that conglomeration leads to
diminished diversity and quality - but there are real problems surrounding the evidence
for this.
Changing Strategies 2: \'erticnl Integration
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The imperative towards vertical integration is strong in the cultural industries, because
of the vital importance of circulation. This in turn derives from the need to control
relationships nith fickle audiences, and the need to create artificial scarcity for public
goods. That is why so many of the key industries ham been dominated by an oligopoly
of vertically integrated companies. Ho~vevera, s ni th conglomeration, vertical integration
strategies are subject to change; and there are signs of partial disintegration in some
industries, and new forms of integration. I
\\'hereas in the late 19SOs commentators thought that Sony ~vouldb e the archetypal
cultural-industry corporation, in the 1990s the future seemed to be represented by
Disney. For the success of Disney in the 1990s was based on an understanding of the
importance of intellectual property: that the cultural industries increasingly operate
around the ownership of rights to films, TIT programmes, songs, brands. By circulating
these symbols across many different media, characters, icons and narratives become
increasingly present in public consciousness. New characters and icons can be launched
through intensive cross-promotion. Crucial to this strategy though has been vertical
integration. Disney not only owns a remarkable back catalogue of films and recordings,
its theme parks, hotels, and so on, it also has its own television network and cable
channel (it has had its own international distribution company, Buena ITista, for decades).
Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
-
With its purchase of Capital Cities/ABC in 1995, Disney became one of the largest
cultural-industry companies in the world. But it was not just the size of the corporation
that made this significant event, it was also the perception that Disney had understood
the nature of the new cultural industries: that combining oivnership of content and
distribution was the way for~vard. In its list of the biggest media companics (by turnover)
in 1998-9, Screei~D igest (July 1999: 176) noted that 'the top companies are all#p#分頁標題#e#
highly diversified - vertically and horizontally integrated'.
\\'c must be cautious about portraying developments in the cultural industries as a
steady advance of vertical integration. By 2001, analysts were speculating that Disney's
fortunes were in reverse, after the poor performance of the blockbuster film Pearl
Harbor. There has been plenty of movement in the last 20 years amay from vertical
integration. One of the major organisational forms of the early complex professional
era, public service television, represented a striking example of vertical integration in
the public interest, justified on the grounds that it ensured a coherent schedule of
entertainment and information for national citizens. hIany of the public service monopolies
had programme-makers of all kinds, technical and creative, on permanent contracts,
made programmes, controlled broadcasting distribution and some even made the
television sets. In the 1990s, ho\vei-er, there \\-as a boom in independent television
production across much of the world, driven mainly by two processes: public service
corporations dealt with budget cuts by subcontracting production; and policy-makers
wanted to encourage growth in the independent sector by measures such as setting
quotas of how much production had to be outsourced. This led many commentators to
talk of a new era of post-Fordist television, involving flexible working arrangements and
networks of interdependent firms, rather than monolithic organisations (Lash and Urry,
1993: Chapter 5; see Robins and Cornford, 1992 for a more sceptical account). \\'hether
this resulted in greater creative autonomy for programme makers is another matter.
\Ire shall return to the issue of whether independent production has allowed greater
autonomy for symbol creators later in this chapter.
Th e trend in the US audiovisual industries has been to~vardsv ertical integration. I t
is ironic that while classical public service television permitted wrtical integration, the
US system, associated with a more market-oriented approach to cultural production,
aimed at discouraging it. With marketisation, the disintegration amongst European
broadcasters has been reversed in the USA. One of the main ways in which US policymakers
sought to control the mighty power of the networks was to restrict vertical
integration by limiting ho\v many local stations the networks could own. And from the
early 1960s on, the broadcasters bought nearly all of their TV and radio programmes
in packages from independent production companies, such as MTM (which made T/re
h1at-y filler Aloore Sllom and Hill Street Bl~res)a nd Lorimar (Dallas, Krtots Landit~g)( see
Sterling and Kittross, 1990: 559-63). Some Hollyivood studios acted as 'independent'
producers in this system, most notably \\'arner Bros. In the late 1990s, all this changed.#p#分頁標題#e#
The networks were increasingly part of the same media and leisure conglomerates as
the major Holly\vood studios, and consequently turned to these sibling companies for
most of their productions. Those netyorks not owned by studio-owning conglomerates
folio\\-ed suit, as the studios gained in prestige. According to a report cited byR3cChesney
(1999: 21), the sis Holly\vood major studios produced 37 out of 36 new prime-time
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s h o ~ ssc heduled for the Fall/Autumn of 1998. Such integration was apparent further
don.nstreatll too. Not only were companies such as Columbia (that is, Sony) buying up
cincn~asb, ut the studios were now owned by the same companies that owned the other
major outlets for films: broadcast and cable television, plus video hire networks. Disney
ABC, plus numerous cable networks; News Corporation owned Fos and had
launched a new television network of the same name in the mid-1980s; Viacom owned
Paramount Studios and the fledgling network UPN and in 1999 bought CBS, one of
the big three netn-orks; Time-\ITarner dominated cable net\vorks, and through its purcl~
aseo f Ted Turner's company T N T in 1997, owned the key cable channels. Even
llcrc, in the case of the USA, such transformations cannot be portrayed as an entirely
nen- era of vertical integration. The intcgration of Hollyivood studios with television
netn-orks represented a return to the strategies Holly\vood used during the classic studio
era, from the 1920s to the 1950s. The recording industry also sho\vs high levels of vertical
integration. For decades, the major companies have o\vned pressing and distribution,
;IS well as contracting musicians to them. However, the majors have rarely attempted
to on-n retail outlets, in part because of the complesity and multiplicity of the market
for music. \\'hat is more, the relationship with independent production is more complex
in the music industry than in any other industry (see the section on small companies,
below).
Vertical integration is best seen not as a constant process, whereby companies get
more and more vcrtically integrated over time, but as something historically variable
across different industries. Changes in government policy, the arrival of new technologies
and new business fashions can all bring about shifts towards or away from vertical#p#分頁標題#e#
integration.
Market Concentration and its Limitations
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The issue of market concentration has been central to work on the cultural industries
in liberal-pluralist communication studies and in political economy approaches to
culture. Chapter 2 noted high levels of market concentration in the cultural industries
but pointed out that, in some cases, the arrival of corporations in new markets actually
reduced the level of market concentration. Good, historically comparative statistics on
market concentration are hard to find. Instead, we have to rely on snapshots of particular
times, and these need to be treated \iith caution. l
\\'hat have been the effects of conglomeration on corporate domination of cultural
markets? Ben Bagdikian (2000) provides something of an indication of the effects of
such conglomeration in terms of general cultural market concentration. For the first
http://www.mythingswp7.com/dissertation_writing/edition of his book Tlze Aledia AlonopolJI, Bagdikian compiled an apparently unpublished
list of the dominant media firms in the US market in 1983 in the following
industries: newspapers, magazines, television, book publishing, motion pictures. For
each industry, he \\orlied down the lists of dominant companies, counting how many
I
companies it took to account for more than 50 per cent of market share (measured in ?
L different ways for different media). He then added the figures together and calculated \
a total of 50 dominant corporations across the media as a whole. !
l
Bagdikian has repeated the exercise for every subsequent edition of his book, and in
the most recent edition (Bagdikian, 2000: ss-ssi) summarises the results.
This is a crude method of measuring overall cultural-industry concentration and conglomeration,
but it draws attention to the increasing size and scope of the biggest
corporations, and their increasing tendency to ~vork across all the different cultural
industries.
Writing about the USA, AIcChesney (1999: 17-18) provides a number of examples
of concentration in recent years, with some historical comparison:
In 1997, the six largest film studios dominated over 90 per cent of US box office
revenues and produccd 132 out of the l48 films to receive wide distribution.
The five largest music groups account for over S7 per cent of the US market.
In cable, ~vhich was once a market \vithout significant oligopoly control, according
to AlcChesncy, six cable companies had effective monopoly control over local
markets across 80 per cent of the USA by 1998.
Four radio chains controlled one-third of the radio industry's annual rcvenues of
USS13.6 billion (though in fact some would say that this does not suggest a particularly#p#分頁標題#e#
high concentration ratio compared with most industries of comparable size).
In 1985, the 12 largest theatre (that is, cinema exhibition) companies in the USA
controlled 25 per cent of the screens; by 1998, that figure was 61 per cent.
Between 1992 and 1998, the share ofbooks sold by independent booksellers fell from
42 per cent to 20 per cent, as Barnes and Noble entered the market.
T h e accun~ulationo f evidence suggests an irresistible tide stveeping the cultural industries
toivards ever-greater levels of market concentrntion. But much depends on the
historical framework \ve decide to examine. Radio became more concentrated in the
light of the 1996 US Telecommunications Act, but it was still much less concentrated
than in the days of network control; in 1945,95 per cent of all radio stations were affiliated
with one or more of the four national nct~vorks( Sterling and Kittross, 1990: 260).
And concentration levels in cinema exhibition are still relatively low compared with
other industries, and certainly compared with the days when the major studios owned
them, that is, prior to 1948, whcn government antitrust action rcsulted in the studios
selling off their cinema interests.
As for nen. industries such as cable, there is bound to be a process of oligopolisation
as such industries mature and as smaller firms are snaffled up by those aiming to increase
market sharc. That's capitalism. This is not to be complacent about existing levels of
market concentration. But such statistics do not prove, in themselves, the existence of
long-term processes of irtcr-eased concentration in US markets. Market concentration
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.rfiblc 2.3 Alcdia concentration in n'estern Europe
Circulation share of top Circulation share of r\udicncc market share
five publishing top five ne~vspaper of top t\\-o TIT
Countr~ companies titles channels
tlustria
iklgiunl (fr)
I~elgium( fl)
Denmark
I7inland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Nor~vay
I'ortugal
Spain
Sn-cden
S\ritzerland (d)
Sn-itzerlanrl (fr)
UK
Source: hleier and Trappcl, 1998: 51, bascd on EC statistical sourccs.
levels are high across all industries - but even in the wider economy, there is evidence
that market concentration does not always go up in advanced industrial economies as a
n.hole.'
What about European figures? In their study of media concentration in Europe,
AIeier and Trappel(1998: 51) provide some figures on concentration bascd on European#p#分頁標題#e#
Union sources (see Table 2.3). They suggest very high levels of concentration in book
publishing, newspapers and television. But again these are non-historical and, given
that in many countries television was entirely dominated by one or two channels until
the 19SOs, there may even be significant reductions ofconcentration, at least in the terms
used here. r
Sinchez-'hbernero et al. (1993: 102) compiled statistics comparing the market share
of the two largest daily newspaper groups in 1975 and 1990 across 17 European countries
(see Table 2.4). Even here, however, the trends were mixed across the l5 countries
\vliere figures were available. Five recorded significant increases; four small increases;
three large decreases and three small decreases. This certainly does not point to a
Europe-nick trend towards significant market concentration in this cultural industry
though, as Sinchcz-Tabernero et al. point out, their figures do not capture regional
trends within countries. In some countries, such as the Netherlands, fewer and fewer
cities had more than one ncn-spaper.'
AIy concern here is primarily ~vi tht he difficulties of proving that levels of market
concentration have substantially increased in the cultural industries since the late 1970s.
Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge"
3 6 Dncid Hesimoizdlzalgh 1 I
Table 2.1 Changes in newspaper market concentration
Country 1973 (46) 1990 (96)
Austria
Belgiun~( fl)
Belgium (fr)
Srvitzerland
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Finland
France
U#
Grcecc
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugl
S\\-eden
Turkey
The figures refer to the share of circulation held by the two largest newspaper groups.
* estimate.
** 1976 figures.
Sorrrce: Slnchez-Tabernero et al., 1993: 102, reporting European Institute for the hIcdia
figures.
But economists find it difficult to agree on any reliable measure of market concentration
even in the same period (see Iosifides, 1997)) leaving aside the difficulties of historical
comparison. One issue amongst many others, for example, is whether different divisions
of the same corporation, which at least in principle compete with each other, should be
counted as ~ o m ~ e t i t o rEsv. ~en more difficult to prove via reliable statistics is that
increased levels of market concentration lead to reduced levels of diversity of output.
I None of this is to deny the importance of the presence of large corporations in cultural
markets. Indeed, it is on this particular point that analysis should focus, rather
l than on the red herring of market concentration. The case for increased corporate
control cannot be made via analysis of market concentration figures in quite such a
, - clear-cut way as some writers would have us believe, through a rhetorical piling-up#p#分頁標題#e#
of statistics. Processes of conglomeration and integration, and the increasing size and
I scope of the largest cultural-industry corporations, are more important. These require
Separate treatment.
The Continuing Presence of Small Companies
Independent producers proliferated - and became important to debates about cultural
production - even as large corporations became dominant in the cultural industries in
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11-
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the middle of the tlventieth century. As cultural corporations have become bigger
and more dominant, small companies have continued to boom in number. According
to one analyst, 80 per cent of the Holly\vood film industry is made up of companies
\vith four employees or fewer Uack Kyser, cited by hlagder and Burston, 2002). Even
during the period when the book industry was involved in successive naves of mergers
and acquisitions, the number of book companies active in the USA increased from
993 in 1960 to 2,298 in 1987, according to Department of Commerce figures (Greco,
1996: 234).
The continued importance of small companies can partly be esplained by the fact
that the conception stage of tests remains small-scale and relatively inespensive, and
still takes place in relatively autonomous conditions. But there are other factors, more
specific to the 1980-2000 period, accounting for the still-prevalent role of small
companies.
The onset of new media technologies brought about by the combined factors of
government marketisation policy and intensified business interest in leisure and
culture: This has created new types of cultural industry, and before industries
'mature', there is often more room for manoeuvre for independents. Key examples
of such independent-friendly new cultural industries over the last 20 years are computer
games, multimedia production (for esample, educational CD-ROhls) and
Ivebsite design. But the introduction of new technologies is also a product of, and
in turn a cause of, a proliferation of new sub-sectors within longer-established
industries. For esample, as live performance by successfiil rock acts has become
more and more important, from the 1970s onwards, a host of new companies have
sprung up providing technical and other forms of support, including amplification
specialists, but also lighting and set designers, and so on.
The rise of a discourse of entrepreneurialism in the economy as a whole (Keat and
Abercrombie, 1991): There has been increasing emphasis since the 1970s on the
value of 'going it alone', separately from large bureaucratic organisations. This has
not only made people willing to set up their own businesses, but it has made large
businesses more willing to interact with them.#p#分頁標題#e#
As culture has become recognised as a valid form of profit making, banks have
become much more prepared to lend venture capital to small and medium-sized
cultural businesses.
I
As ive have seen, industries such as television, dominated by vertically-integrated
companies, have seen some disintegration. This has not only brought about an
independent production sector, it has also created many ancillary and technical
support companies, from film and television catering specialists to companies that
rent out editing suites and personnel.
There has been an increasing emphasis in cultural-industry companies on marketing.
So there are also scores of design studios, independent advertising agencies and
so on aimed at servicing companies that are increasingly willing to pay more to
market their goods and services. ll'hat is more, actors, performers and other symbol
creators can subsidise their other work, which they may feel is their 'real' work, by
operating in these sectors. This has alivays happened, but now more than ever.
Supplied by The British Library - "The world's knowledge" .
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Accounts that focus on conglomeration, integration and the increasing size of the cultural-
industry corporations (such as many accounts from the Schiller-AIcChesney
tradition) often understate the importance of small companies. Such companies may
account for small levels of market share, but they arc important in terms of the numbers
of people they employ, and in terms of their potential to foster - or at least act as a
conduit for - innovation. This, along with other factors, has meant a strong ethical and
aesthetic premium has been placed on institutional independence.
This is particularly apparent in the film industry and in the recording industry.
Crucial in many music genres has been a discourse of independence amongst musicians,
fans and journalists. This has allowed independent record companies, in some exceptional
cases, to serve as the centre of commercial networks which form something of an
alternative to prevailing systems of cultural production and consun~ption. For Jason
Toynbee, the particular importance attached to independent production in popular
music derives from a longstanding history of 'institutional autonomy' (Toynbee, 2000:
19-25) in popular music-making, which cuts against the efforts of large companies to
make profits out of music. This derives from the dispersed, decentralised nature of
music-making. Institutional autonomy means that not only do companies cede control
ofproduction to musicians (as in all cultural industries); there is also a tendency towards
'spatially dispersed production in small units' (rock groups, swing bands) and 'a strong
continuity betv-een production and consumption' in musical subcultures (Toynbee,
2000: 1). Audiences and performers come together in 'proto-markets', which are only#p#分頁標題#e#
partially commodified, and where there is a great deal of resentment toivards the industry
and 'selling out'. The possibility of institutional autonomy and the high value
attached to it in musical subcultures means that spaces have been created where alternative
arrangements for the management and marketing of creativity can be tried out. I
discuss an important example of such an 'alternative' dynamic later in this chapter.
Interdependence, Interfirm Networks and Alliances
Small companies, then, not only continue to exist; they are multiplying. However, there
is a vital caveat, already referred to in passing in the above discussion of independent
record companies. A key change in the cultural industries in the years since the 1970s
has been that small and large companies are increasipgly interdependent: they are
involved in complex net\vorks of licensing, financing and distribution.
One of the most important ways in which corporations have changed their organisational
structures, in nearly all major areas of business, is that they increasingly subcontract
to small and medium-sized firms. These smaller firms are potentially more
dynamic and able to innovate; but they are increasingly involved in close relationships
with the corporations that subcontract to them. This is true too of the cultural
industries.
Such webs of interdependence are not entirely new in the cultural industries. In the
film industry, as the Hollyn.ood corporations lost their control over production in
the 1950s, new independent production companies entered the market to cater for
specialist products, but the Holly\vood studios acted as distributors and financiers of
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1- ._
1-
re.
1s
a1
;nc~cpendent ly-prod~~fieldm s (see Aksoy and Robins, 1992). Even in an era in the
recording industry when 'majors' and 'independents' were seen by fans, musicians and
critics as polar opposites, in truth they were often linked in licensing, financing and
distribution deals. Such arrangements, whereby small and large companies form interdependent
tvebs, became increasingly prevalent in the 1980s and extended into new
arcas of the cultural industries, most significantly in European broadcasting, where
traditionally production had been handled 'in house' by large state and public service
broadcasters (Robins and Cornford, 1992).
Thcre are renards for both corporations and small companies in such systems of
interfirm networking. For the corporations, acting as distributors and financiers
of independent producers is an extension of what they already do, in acting as distributors
and financiers of their own semiautonomous divisions. A large multi-divisional
corpor,ltion might get a loiver cut of revenues from a test produced by an independent#p#分頁標題#e#
company than from the sales of a text created within one of their own divisions, but the
arrangement means that they can get independent companies to bear some of the risks
associated ~vi tht he difficult business of managing symbolic crcativity. llThati s more,
symbol creators might ~velfle el as though they are more autonomous of commercial
pressures, especially in cultural industries ~vhere there is a nlistrust of corporate
bureaucracies.
'I'his makes interdependence sound very rosy. However, in the eyes of many, increasing
levels of interdependence in the cultural industries mean the end of an ern \\hen
independents could provide an alternative to the majors: another sign of corporate
takeover. And many forms of interfirm networking involve links between very large
companies in different industries, and increasingly in different sectors. These involve
strategic alliances between corporations, not as in traditional cartel arrangements, but
on the basis of specific projects. Such 'alliance capitalism' has been a feature of a very
~ i d rean ge of businesses over the last 20 pears. It is especially relevant, says Castells
(1996: 162--l), in high-tech sectors, where research and development costs are enormously
expensive. For Castells, the self-sufficient corporation is increasingly a thing of
the past.
ll'hile cultural-industry companies compete with each other, at the same time, they
operate complex ~vebs of joint ventures and o~vnership. Auletta (1997: 225) lists a
number of reasons for such alliances with potential rivals:
I
To avoid competition
To save money and share risks
To buy a seat on a rival's board
To create a safety net, as technological innovation makes for increasing
uncertainty
To make links with foreign companies to avoid 'arousing the ire of local
governments'.
The interconnections amongst the six biggest cultural-industry corporations and the
'second tier' of the Big 48 are almost in~possibleto encapsulate neatly. One of the best
attempts to capture the complexity of links bet~veend ifferent corporations was printed
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Brasil
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be
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Figure 2.1 A web of collaboration. This diagram, reproduced from a 1997 edition of The A'em
YorX,er, illustrates the many complex connections existing at thc time between a number of . companies in the cultural-industry and IT business (Auletta, 1997: 227)
by T11e Arem Yorker in 1997 (see Figure 2.1). It shows the 'web of collaboration' between
six of the most powerful cultural-industry corporations in the world at the time, plus
h4icrosoft, and lists some of the many joint ventures betu-een them. In the rapidlychanging
world of the cultural industries, this diagram is already a historical document;#p#分頁標題#e#
but it gives a good sense of how closely intermeshed the major companies are, in terms
of joint ventures and ownership. Auletta (1997) describes such links as an American
Omnerslrip, Organisation, arrd Cr~ltrrral ll'ork 4 l
of keiretsu - the 'ancient Japanese custom of co-opting the competition' through
creating structures of collaboration wit11 rivals; a system of 'co-opetition' (A,furdock,
2000: 48, quoting Tlre Fi~lancial Tilnes) rather than competition. As Auletta (1997: 226)
S l l g g ~ ~stu~ch, alliances have implications for tests. As mor e and mor e companies
become tied to one another, ivill their journalists cover controversial stories about other
conlpanies in the \\-eh? Without question, it helps to reinforce the economic po\\-er of
the biggcst corporations. Such alliances have been further encouraged by speculation
about future convergence of the te~ecommunications, computers and cultural
industries.'
HBO Ole
iBO Brasil
Notes
1. Historical comparison of the relative size of the largest cultural-industry corporations is
difficult. Companies based on 'services' were on11 included in the f'orrrrne 500 and Global
j0O from 1995 on\l-ards.
2. \Tery divcrse general conglonlerates continue to be a feature of the South East Asian business
landscape right.up to the time of nriting. The struggles of, for example, Korean general
conglomerates such as Dae\voo may or may not affirm European and North American commitment
to s>-nergy-based diversification. Some North American general conglon~eratcs
such as General Electric thrived in the late 1990s.
3. Such hard\\-are/softn.are synergies were not unprecedented by any means: the Dutch
consumer electronics group Philips had its own record division (PolyGram) for
decades until it sold it to Seagram in 1993. And the US networks were founded on such
synergics: NBC was part of the communications conglomerate RCA, which made radio
equipment.
4. Cihemawat and Ghadar (2000) arguing against global megamergers as a business strategy,
present evidence to show declining global concentration levels in automobiles, oil and other
key industries, including even high-tech industries. Systematic comparisons of market concentration
in the cultural industries with levels elsewhere are extremely rare. Alurdock and
Golding (1977) is a rare and obviously outdated exception.
5. Sinchez-Tabernero et al.'s market share statistics for radio and television are also ambiguous.
They show that private companies were becoming involved in these markets but do not
provide evidence of significant market concentration.
6. Christianen (1995: 89-91) argues that concentration in the music industry should take
account of different record company divisions as separate entities, so that all the different
labels under each conglomerate's control would be counted separately, because they are in#p#分頁標題#e#
internal competition with each other. This would make conccntration figures much 1011-er,
and n-ould help account for the greater diversity of product that follo\ved from some periods
of apparent market conccntration.
7. See Herman and hIcChesney (1997: 56-8) and AIurdock (2000: 47-51) for further discussion
of such alliances.
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Critical AIass in Image hlarkets. Cn~~~bridgeJorrnolfn El conomics 16, pp. 1-22.
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r\uletta, Ken (1997). American Kciretsu. Tlre era l'orker, October 20 and 27, pp. 225-7.
Bagdikian, Ben H. (2000). The ~llerfin~ llotropol~6~th, cdn. Iloston: Ilcacon Prcss.
Brenner, Robcrt (2000). The Iloom and thc I3ubble. ern Lefr Reciern I1 6, pp. 513.
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Christianen, I\lichac1(1995). Cyclcs in Symbol Production? A Nc\v Alodcl to Explain Conccntmtion,
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Grcco, Albcrt N. (1995). Alcrgcrs and Acquisitions in thc US Book Industry, 1960-89. In: Philip
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Kcat, Russcll S: Nicholas Abcrcrombie (cds.) (1991). Lrlterprise Crrltrtre. London: Routlcdgc.
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, AlcChesncy, Robcrt \l'. (1999). Rirlr Jlledirr, Poor Denrorrncj~. Urbana ancl Chicago, Illinois:
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l
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