理學(xué)碩士比較研究和跨文化研究方法和碩士研究方法2014

Philosophy of Science and Social Scientific Research Practise

Professor Gerard Delanty (Dept of Sociology)

Autumn Term, Weeks 1-12

Timetable:

Wed 9-12 Location: PEV1 2A12

Start date: Wednesday 24th Sept.

Course Aims

 

The aim of this course is to introduce students to some of the standard methodological and philosophical problems posed by social inquiry. These mostly branch out from one central question: are the methods of the social sciences essentially the same or essentially different from those of the natural sciences? An additional aim of the course is to show how theoretical and philosophical traditions in social science influence the methodological approaches and theoretical models that guide social research practice. 

 

Each week we take one or, in some cases, two examples of major philosophical or theoretical approaches. These will be outlined with an emphasis on the theoretical model of society that they advocate. Secondly, it will be demonstrated what methodological implications for social research follow from these philosophical and theoretical ideas. In this way it will be shown that broad theoretical frameworks and concepts, often based in philosophical traditions, lead to particular methological approaches around theoretical models. Overall the objective of the course is to show how theory can be operationalized as a method of analysis for empirical research.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

The topics that will be addressed include: developments in the philosophy of science from positivism to post-positivism and their relevance to social inquiry, explanation versus interpretation and the interpretive critique of social science; problems of validity and values; realism and constructivism; the advantages and disadvantages of taking a critical stance; and feminist and postcolonial critiques of social science. Although the problems will be illustrated in specific texts, you are also encouraged to pursue parallel arguments in different sources. 

 

Assessment: 4,000 word term paper. 

Submission deadline  Please see your 'Assessment Deadlines and Exam Timetable' in Sussex Direct for the submission deadline and location. It is your responsibility to know when and where you should submit your work. Late submission will be penalised unless acceptable mitigating evidence is also submitted.

 

Practical Information

 

Please note this module is managed by the Doctoral School, but taught by the Department of Sociology

 

Course Tutor:

 

Professor G. Delanty (Professor of Sociology and Social& Political Thought)

 

Email: [email protected]

Tel No: 01273 (67) 8658

Room No: Freeman G43

Office Hrs:                                      Tues 12-1 and Wed 12-1 

   

 

Administrative queries: contact Grace Jones (Doctoral School)

 

Email address:  [email protected]     

 

Please note we begin at 9.00 sharp. Please avoid coming in late and have the relevant readings read (these will be confirmed the week before).

 

It is not possible to join the module after week 2. Attendance of at least nine weeks is required in order to complete the module. An attendance list will be kept.

 

There is no seminar on 5 November

 

Each week, from Week 2, there will be at least one student presentation (10-15 min). The relevant text(s) will be introduced by a student. Please be prepared to volunteer.

 

If you attended the entire module, please complete a module feedback questionnaire.

 

Course Summary

Topic 1 Introduction and summary 

Topic 2 Neopositivism and Functionalism #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

Topic 3 Methodological Individualism and Critical Realism 

Topic 4 Interpretative Social Science: Hermeneutics and Phenomenology 

Topic 5 New Histories of Science: Kuhn and Foucault

Topic 6 Social Contructionism and Discourse Theory 

Topic 7 Critical Social Science   

Topic 8 Critical and Pragmatic Social Science 

Topic 9 Feminist epistemology  

Topic 10 Postcolonial social science

 

Each topic corresponds approximately to a week, with at least one additional week devoted to a review and some case studies around selected projects

 

Readings:

The reading list is designed to encourage the consultation of diverse sources in order to identify common concerns and problems. 

 

There are no set texts, but this text will be a key resource will be this volume:

Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings, edited by Gerard Delanty and Piet Strydom. Open University Press, 2003. The volume consists of 64 edited extracts with commentary from classic works in the philosophy of social science. Many of the key readings taken from this volume. A Pdf file of the book is available on Study Direct and the readings can be directly down-loaded from it.

 

There is 'core reading' of three or four articles or chapters per session in order to provide a focus to discussion which all students are expected to read. Many of these readings can be downloaded from Study Direct. 

 

Readings addressing empirical social research are given under Discussion and Applications. Most of these readings are journal articles and can be downloaded directly from the library or from Study Direct. Others will be provided during the course.

 

The ‘further reading’ offers an opportunity to locate the topic in a wider context or to pursue more specialised aspects for essays.

 

Background reading

G. Delanty Social Science: Philosophical and Methodological Foundations. Second edition, 2005 Open University Press/Minneapolis

B. Fay Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science: A Multicultural 

Approach (Blackwell,1996) 

Mark J. Smith Social Science in Question (Sage, 1998). Core text for the Open University course corresponding to this one; very clear and well presented and illustrated. 

Patrick Baert, Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Towards pragmatism (Polity 2005). See also the special issue of the European Journal of Social Theory 7 (3) 2004 edited by B. Turner and P. Baert on pragmatism. 

T. Benton and I. Craib Philosophy of Social Science (Palgrave, 2001) is also a useful guide to the literature.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

N Blaikie Approaches to Social Inquiry. (Polity, 1993) is an excellent guide.

Mantzavinos, C. (ed) 2010 Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Philosophical Theory and Scientific Practice. Cambridge University Press

Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science edited by Michael Martin and Lee C McIntyre (MIT Press, 1994) is a useful collection popular in the US, although one that emphasises neo-positivistic approaches.

M. Root Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993)

G. Potter The Philosophy of Social Science (Prentice Hall, 2000)

S. Turner (ed) The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Social Science (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003)

W. Outhwaite and S. Turner (eds) The Sage Handbook of Social Science Methodology. (Sage, 2008)

 

For an overview of the postmodern, poststructuralist critique of social inquiry, see:

 

D. R. Dickens and A. Fontana (eds) Postmodernism and Social Enquiry (UCL Press, 1994)

 

A very good overview of debates in the philosophy of science is:

 

A.F. Chalmers What is This Thing Called Science? (Open UP, 1982)

See also:

A.F. Chalmers Science and its Fabrication (Open UP, 1990)

R. Klee Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at its Seams (OUP, 1997).

General anthologies in the philosophy of science are:

Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science, edited by E. Klemke et al, (Prometheus Books, 1998)

Philosophy of Science edited by Boyd et al (Harvard University Press, 1997)

Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science edited by R. Kelle (Oxford University Press, 1999) 

 

On the connection between philosophies of science, social science and specific methods of research, see:

 

P. Diesing Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). Esp, Part III.

M. Williams and T. May Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Research (UCL Press, 1996).

D. Marsh and G. Stoker Theory and Method in Political Science 2nd edition. (Palgrave).

 

A recent and rather basic textbook useful for students of political science Della Porta, D. And Keating, M. eds Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences Cambridge University Press, 2008

 

On philosophical and methodological issues in anthropology, this is particularly useful:

H. Moore (ed) Anthropology in Theory. Blackwell, 2007)

 

Topic 1:  Introduction:

This session serves two functions.  Firstly, it provides a broad overview of the course and the connections between the topics, in particular outlining the three main traditions within the philosophy of social science.  Secondly, it considers the issues of disciplinary and interdisciplinary research and in particular the relation between philosophy and social science. In addition to these aims, the session will clarify some of the basic concepts in the philosophy of science more generally as well as discussing the nature of scientific knowledge. The problem of explanation will be one of the main topics to be addressed in this session.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Topic 2:  Neopositivism and Functionalism

The session deals with some of the most important neopositivist theories of scientific methodology, taking Popper and functionalist approaches as the key examples of a conception of social science that emphasizes explanation. Popper’s theory of falsification as the defining characteristic of science has been the single most influential theory of science in the 20th century. Arising from the neo-positivist theory of science are various functionalist approaches which have tended to emphasize explanation based on the search for generalizable laws as the primary aim of social science. Carl Hempel has been one of the most prominent philosophers of social science in the functionalist neo-positivist tradition of a general theory of science. We look at a debate on whether or not the social sciences are based on the discovery of general laws. The focus here will be on functionalism as a methodological approach.

 

Core Text

 

Gary Goertz and James Mahoney ‘Concepts and Measurment: Onto,ogy and Epistemology’ Social Science Information 5 (2): 205-16

 

Core texts:

Karl Popper ‘The Problem of Induction’ 

 

Carl Hempel ‘Concept and Theory in Social Science’

 

(both of these are in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings).

 

Discussion and applications:

K. Davis ‘The myth of functional analysis as a special method in sociology and social anthropology’ American Sociological Review 24, no 6 (Dec) 1959 (can be downloaded from the library)

 

J. Roberts ‘There are no Laws of the Social Sciences’

and

H. Kincaid ‘There are Laws in the Social Sciences’

(Both are in Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science, C. Hitchock, ed., Blackwell, 2004).

 

Seminar Questions:

 

1. What is the defining feature of scientific knowledge in Popper’s view?

 

2   What is the principle of falsification and how relevant is this to social science?

 

3 Is it possible to avoid functionalist explanations in social science?

 

4 Does social scientific investigation need to be grounded in a general theoretical framework?

 

5 Is social science based on the search for general laws?#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Further reading:

A useful further volume on developments in the philosophy of science is:

 

A.F. Chalmers What is This Thing Called Science? (Open UP, 1982), especially Ch 3,4,5 (second edition) or Ch 4,5,6 (third edition)

 

See also:

 

Alexander Bird Philosophy of Science (London: Routledge, 1998).

P. Macmamer and M. Silberstein eds The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science (Blackwell 2002 ).

 

An excellent selection of core readings in the philosophy of science and social science is: S. Brown, J. Fauvel and R. Finnegan (eds) Conceptions of Inquiry (Methuen,1981).

 

On philosophical problems on explanation:

S. Psillos Causation and Explanation (Acumen, 2002)

 

Much of the debate is conducted as a debate over 'positivism'. Some idea of the difficulty with terminology is provided by Halfpenny's twelve definitions:

 

P. Halfpenny Positivism and Sociology: Explaining Social Life (Allen and Unwin, 1982)

 

Standard positivist interpretations of social science:

E. Nagel The Structure of Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968) Chs 13, 14

C.G. Hempel Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Macmillan, 1970) esp Ch 9

Key extracts are in Delanty and Strydom

 

A useful overview of logical positivist philosophy:

O. Hanfling Logical Positivism (Columbia University Press, 1981) 

 

For general treatments of positivism in the social sciences, see:

P. Cohen Modern Social Theory (Heinemann, 1968) Ch 1

J.C. Alexander Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Volume I: Positivism, Presuppositions and Current Controversies (Routledge, 1982) Ch 1

T. Benton Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) Ch 2

R. Keat, J. Urry Social Theory as Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) Chs 2, 5

P. Baert Social Theory in the Twentieth Century (Polity, 1998), Ch 8

 

The debate over positivism has had an important role in the development of 'critical' theory in Germany. See:

T.W. Adorno et al The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (Heineman, 1976)

 

A recent attempt at outlining a neo-positivist social science is:

J.H. Turner 'Analytical theorising' in A. Giddens, J.H. Turner (eds) Social Theory Today (Polity, 1987).

J.H Turner ‘Introduction: Can sociology be a cumulative science?’ in J.H. Turner (ed) Theory Building in Sociology: Assessing Theoretical Cumulation (Sage, 1989).

 

On the idea of science see:

S. Fuller, Steve (1997) Science  (University of Minnesota Press, 1997)

 

One debate which has had particular significance for theories of social science is the 'Popper-Kuhn' debate. See:

T.S. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U of Chicago Press, 1962)

K. Popper Conjectures and Refutations (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963) Chs 3, 10

 

For a discussion of Popper’s views on social inquiry, see:

A. O’Hear Karl Popper (Routledge, 1980) Ch 8

 

Perhaps, the most developed 'Popperian' statement is the elaboration of 'sophisticated falsificationism' by Lakatos:

I. Lakatos 'Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes' in Collected Papers, Volume I (Cambridge UP, 1978) and in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge UP, 1970)

 

For a 'Lakatosian' treatment of social science, see;

D. Papineau For Science in Social Science (Macmillan, 1978) Ch 2

 

For more on science as ‘problem-solving’, see:

L. Laudan Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977)

 

Good general discussions of functionalism are:

M. Abrahamson Functionalism (Prentice Hall, 1978).

J.H. Turner The Structure of Sociological Theory (Dorsey, 1986) esp Part One

W.E. Moore ‘Functionalism’ in T. Bottomore, R. Nisbet (eds) A History of Sociological Analysis (Heinemann, 1979)

 

See, also:

P. Baert Social Theory in the Twentieth Century (Polity, 1998), Ch 2

B. Barnes The Elements of Social Theory (UCL Press, 1995) Ch 2

 

A ‘classic’ statement of the necessity of functionalism is:

K. Davis ‘The myth of functional analysis as a special method in sociology and social anthropology’ American Sociological Review 24, 1959

 

Much of the philosophical literature on functionalism tends to affirm methodological individualism and criticise what is held to be an inappropriate form of teleology at odds with a proper causal understanding. For the most important statement, see:

C. G. Hempel ‘The logic of functional analysis’ in L. Gross (ed) Symposium on Functional Analysis (Row, Peterson and Co, 1959)

 

For a good formal defence, see:

W.J. Isajiw Causation and Functionalism in Sociology (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968)

 

An equivalent defence of Marxist functionalism is:

G. A. Cohen Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence (Clarendon, 1978) Chs IX, X#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

[A short version of the argument is G. A. Cohen ‘Forces and relations of production’ in History, Labour and Freedom: Themes from Marx (Clarendon, 1988)]

 

Parsons’s strongest statements of functionalism are associated with his later work. See:

T. Parsons The Social System (Routledge, 1950) Chs 1 and 2

T. Parsons Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Prentice-Hall, 1966)

 

For general discussions of Parsons, see:

J. Scott Sociological Theory: Contemporary Debates (Edward Elgar, 1995) Ch 2

I. Craib Modern Social Theory: From Parsons to Habermas (Harvester, 1984) Ch 3

 

On neo-functionalism as a new paradigm, avoiding the problems of earlier forms of functional analysis, see:

J. C. Alexander ‘From functionalism to neofunctionalism: creating a position in the field of social theory’ in Neofunctionalism and After (Blackwell, 1998)

N. Mouzelis Sociological Theory. What Went Wrong? (Routledge, 1995) Ch 7

 

For Alexander’s version of the ‘myth of neofunctionalism as a special method’, see:

J.C. Alexander ‘The new theoretical movement’ in N.J. Smelser (ed) Handbook of Sociology (Sage, 1988) and reprinted in Neofunctionalism and After (Blackwell, 1998)

 

For a critique of Alexander (and others associated with the new theoretical movement), see:

J. Holmwood Founding Sociology? Talcott Parsons and the Idea of General Theory

(Longman 1996) esp Ch 5

S. Turner ‘The end of functionalism’ Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23(2) 1993

 

One important debate over functionalism has concerned the problem of accounting for contradiction and social change. The major statement, is:

D. Lockwood ‘Some remarks on The Social System’ British Journal of Sociology 7( ), 1956

D. Lockwood 'System integration and social integration' in G. Zollschan and W. Hirsch (eds) Explorations in Social Change (Routledge, 1964). Reprinted as an appendix to D. Lockwood Solidarity and Schism: ‘The Problem of Disorder’ in Durkheimean and Marxist Sociology (Clarendon Press, 1992) 

 

The distinction been system and social integration has been widely taken up (for example, by Habermas, Giddens, Mouzelis and Archer among many others). For discussion, see:

N. Mouzelis ‘Social integration and system integration: Lockwood, Habermas, Giddens’Sociology 31(1) 1997

M. Archer ‘Social integration and system integration: developing the distinction’ Sociology 30(4), 1996

 

Topic 3: Methodological Individualism and Critical Realism

The session is concerned with post-positivistic explanatory oriented approaches. We take two quite examples: rational choice or methodological individualism and a more recent naturalistic philosophy of science called critical realism. Both of these emerged out of post-positivistic philosophy of social science while adhering to the main assumptions of the modern scientific method, in particular the attempt to offer an explanatory account of social behaviour and institutional arrangement. They all share a concern with finding a unified methodological approach for the social sciences. Followers of Weber frequently argue that social scientific concepts referring to groups or collectivities can only be ‘short-hand’ conveniences and that they can, in principle, always be broken down into the constituent actions of individual actors. This is usually argued against proponents of ‘holism’, a position attributed to Marx and Durkheim among others. The doctrine of methodological individualism finds greatest support in psychology and economics, but is promoted by rational choice theorists as the means of unifying the social sciences. This session will examine the claims of methodological individualism in the context of rational choice theory and some of the major objections to it.  #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

The other approach we discuss is critical realism. Realists argue that the central task of natural science is to locate the structures of the natural world, that is, the entities and causal powers which produce natural events.  They argue that experiment is central to this search for structures, as it allows investigators to isolate a particular structure and examine its properties.  Turning to social science, realists argue that there are structures in the social world that have properties similar (though not identical) to those in the natural world.  However, they also note that the existence of human agency, and the limited possibilities for experiment in social science, make it difficult to locate and identify these structures.  In this session we discuss realist arguments, and examine whether there are procedures for identifying social structures that can compensate for the difficulties of studying the social realm.  We consider these issues in relation to a debate between Andrew Sayer and John Holmwood about the relationship between capitalist and bureaucratic structures, on the one hand, and gender structures, on the other.

 

Core texts:

R. Bhaskar ‘Transcendental Realism and the Problem of Naturalism’ 

(in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings).

 

Jon Elster ‘Rational Choice and the Explanation of Social Action’

(this is in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings).

 

Discussion and applications:

Critical realism:

A.C. Pratt ‘Putting critical realism to work: the practical implications for geographical research’ Progress in Human Geography 19(1) 1995

 

Yeung, H. ‘Critical realism and realist research in human geography: a method or a philosophy in search of a method?’ Progress in Human Geography, 1997, 21: 51-74

 

A. Sayer: ‘System, Lifeworld and Gender: Associational versus Counterfactual Thinking’, Sociology, 2000, Vol 34, No 4, pp. 705-725

 

J. Holmwood: ‘Gender and Critical Realism: A Critique of Sayer’, Sociology, 2001, Vol 35, No 4, pp. 947-965   (and see also Sayer’s Reply in Sociology, 2001, 35 (4).

 

(these can all be downloaded from the library)

 

Seminar Questions:

 

1. Can all collective categories be reduced to categories relating to individual action?  If not, why not?

 

2. Can rational choice theory explain collective action?

 

3. Are realists correct that experiments cannot be a key tool for social #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

science?  Are there alternatives to experiment that social science can employ?

 

4. How convincing is Sayer’s argument for the priority of abstraction in social science?  

 

5. Is Sayer’s analysis of the relationship between bureaucracy and gender convincing?  How persuasive is Holmwood’s critique of Sayer?

 

Further reading (On Rational Choice):

J.W.N. Watkins ‘Ideal types and historical explanation’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3(1) 1952

 

B. Barnes The Elements of Social Theory (UCL Press, 1995) Ch 1

J. Scott ‘Rational choice and social exchange’ in Sociological Theory: Contemporary Debates (Edward Elgar, 1995)

 

Elaborations of Watkins’s position are:

J.W.N. Watkins ‘The principle of methodological individualism’ British 

Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3(2), 1952.

J.W.N. Watkins ‘Methodological individualism: a reply’ Philosophy of Science 22(1), 1955 [Note, all Watkins’s articles are collected in J. O’Neill (ed) Modes of Individualism and Collectivism (Heinemann, 1973)

 

For Popper’s critique of ‘holism’, see:

K. Popper The Poverty of Historicism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957)

K. Popper ‘What is dialectic’ in Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963)

 

See, also:

J. Agassi ‘Methodological individualism’ in J. O’Neill (ed) Modes of 

Individualism and Collectivism (Heinemann, 1973).

 

The ‘classic’ statements of action categories as the basic categories of social inquiry is:

M. Weber Economy and Society, Volume I (Bedminster Press, 1968), Ch. 1

V. Pareto Sociological Writings (Pall Mall Press, 1966) Part II, Ch 1

 

The ‘classic’ statement of the non-reducibility of ‘social facts’ is:

E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method (Free Press, 1964)

 

See also:

M. Mandelbaum ‘Societal facts’ in J. O’Neill (ed) Modes of Individualism 

and Collectivism (Heinemann, 1973).

S. Turner The Search for a Methodology of Social Science: Durkheim, Weber and the Nineteenth Century Problem of Cause, Probability and Action (Reidel, 1986)

P. Urbach ‘Social propensities’ British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 31( ), 1980

S. Lukes ‘Methodological individualism reconsidered’ in D.Emmet, A. McIntyre

(eds) Sociological Theory and Philosophical Argument (Macmillan, 1970)

M. Archer Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (CUP, 

1995) Ch 1

 

On ‘rational interpretation’, see:

M. Hollis Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action (CUP, 1977), esp Ch 6

 

For a ‘classic’ critique of rational interpretation, see:

A. Schutz ‘The problem of rationality in the social world’ in D. Emmet, A. McIntyre (eds) Sociological Theory and Philosophical Argument (Macmillan, 1970) [note that Schutz’s argument is revised by H. Garfinkel in his ‘The rational properties of commonsense and scientific activities’ in Studies in Ethnomethodology (Prentice Hall, 1967)]

 

For good, general discussions of rational choice theory, see:

D. King, K. Dowding ‘Introduction’ in D. King, K. Dowding (eds) Preferences , Institutions and Rational Choice (OUP, 1995)

J. Elster ‘Introduction’ in J. Elster (ed) Rational Choice (Blackwell, 1996)

J. Coleman ‘Rational reconstruction of society’ American Sociological Review 58(1), 1993

M. Hechter ‘Rational choice foundations of social order’ in J.H. Turner (ed) Theory Building in Sociology: Assessing Theoretical Cumulation (Sage, 1989)

D. Friedman, M. Hechter ‘The comparative advantages of rational choice theory’ in G. Ritzer(ed) Frontiers of Social Theory: The New Syntheses (Columbia UP, 1990)

A. Heath Rational Choice and Social Exchange (CUP, 1976)

 

Books and journal issues devoted to the critical assessment of rational choice approaches are:

J. Coleman and T.J. Fararo (eds) Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique (Sage, 1992) 

 

Sociological Theory 9(2), 1991

D. Green, I. Shapiro The Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory  (Yale UP, 1994)

 

See, also:

M. Zafirovski ‘What is really rational choice? Beyond the utilitarian concept of rationality’ Current Sociology 47(1), 1999

M. Zafirovski ‘Unification of sociological theory by the rational choice model: conceiving the relationship between economics and sociology’ Sociology 33(3), 1999

B. Hindess Choice, Rationality and Social Theory (Unwin Hyman, 1988) 

N. Mouzelis Sociological Theory. What Went Wrong? (Routledge, 1995) Ch 2

E. Sofianou ‘Post-modernism and the notion of rationality in economics’ Cambridge Journal of Economics 19(3), 1995

 

A recent development is the argument that Marxist social theory can be given a foundation in the categories of rational-choice. See:

J. Roemer ‘“Rational choice” Marxism: some issues of method and substance’ in J. Roemer (ed) Analytical Marxism (CUP, 1986)

J. Elster Making Sense of Marx (CUP, 1985) esp Ch 1

A. Przeworski ‘The material bases of consent’ in Capitalism and Social Democracy (CUP, 1985)

E.M. Wood ‘Rational choice Marxism: is the game worth the candle? New Left Review #177

T. Carver, P. Thomas (eds) Rational Choice Marxism (Macmillan 1995)

 

The debate over categories of ‘rational choice’ has frequently concentrated on the narrowness of the conception of rational action and sought to extend it to include ‘non-rational’ (as distinct from irrational) elements. For ‘classic’ statements, see:

M. Weber Economy and Society, Volume 1 (Bedminster Press, 1968), Ch 1

V. Pareto Sociological Writings (Pall Mall Press, 1966), Part II, Ch 1

 

The major statement of the position, drawing on Weber and Pareto, is:

T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action (Free Press, 1937)

 

Similar arguments are made by those who wish to ‘rescue’ Marx and Marxism from the reduction to utilitarian categories attempted by analytical Marxists (and frequently imputed to Marx by non-Marxists). See:

D. Lockwood Solidarity and Schism: ‘The Problem of Disorder’ in Durkheim and Marxist Sociology (Clarendon Press, 1992), esp Ch 10

M. Gould ‘Parsons versus Marx: “an earnest warning ...”’ Sociological Inquiry 51(3/4), 1981.

T. Benton The Rise and Fall of Structuralist Marxism (Macmillan, 1984)

 

A reply to such criticisms (and several articles in further discussion) is:

J. Elster ‘Marxism, functionalism and game theory: the case for methodological individualism’ Theory and Society 11(4), 1982

 

An earlier version of the ‘same’ underlying debate (where rational choice theory was referred to as ‘exchange theory’), see:

H. Turk, R.L. Simpson (eds) Institutions and Exchange: The Sociologies of Talcott Parsons and George Caspar Homans (Bobbs-Merrill, 1971)

J.C. Alexander Twenty Lecture: Sociological Theory Since World War II (Columbia UP, 1987), lectures 10 and 11

See also:

B. Barry Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (Collier-Macmillan, 1970)

 

 

Further reading (On Realism):

R. Collins ‘Sociological Realism’. In Delanty and Strydom

J. Habermas ‘Realism after the Linguistic-Pragmatic Turn’. In Delanty and Strydom

A. Collier: ‘Experiment and Depth Realism’ in Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso, 1994) #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

A. Sayer: ‘Theory and Method I: Abstraction, Structure and Cause’ in Method In Social Science: A Realist Approach (Hutchison, 1984)

S. Kemp,  ‘Critical Realism and the Limits of Philosophy’, European Journal of Social Theory 2005, Vol 8, No. 2, pp. 171-191

 

Joseph, J. and Roberts, J. eds 2004 Realism and Deconstruction. London: Routledge

Lopez, J. and Potter, G. eds 2001. After Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism. London: The Athlone Press.

 

On realism as an analysis of natural science, see:

R. Bhaskar A Realist Theory of Science, 2nd Edition (Verso, 1997 [1975])

R. Bhaskar Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (Verso, 1986)

A. Collier Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso, 1994)

J. Isaac ‘Realism and reality: some realistic considerations’ Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 20(1), 1990

B. Fay ‘Critical realism?’ Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 20(1), 1990

A. Chalmers ‘Is Bhaskar’s realism realistic?’ Radical Philosophy 49 Summer, 1988

M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson, A. Norrie (eds) Critical Realism: Essential Readings (Routledge, 1998)

 

On 'realism' and the social sciences, see:

R. Harré, P.F. Secord The Explanation of Social Behaviour (Blackwell, 1972) esp Ch

7

R. Bhaskar The Possibility of Naturalism (Harvester, 1979) 

R. Bhaskar Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation (Verso, 1986)

R. Harré, C.R. Varela ‘Conflicting varieties of realism: causal powers and the problems of social structure’ Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 26(3), 1996

T. Benton Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) Ch 2

R. Keat, J. Urry Social Theory as Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) Chs 2, 5

W. Outhwaite New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory (Macmillan, 1987) Chs 2, 3

A. Sayer Method in Social Science: A Realist Approach (Hutchinson, 1984)

R. Trigg Understanding Social Science: A Philosophical Introduction to the Social Sciences (Blackwell, 1985)

M. Archer, R. Bhaskar, A. Collier, T. Lawson, A. Norrie (eds) Critical Realism: Essential Readings (Routledge, 1998)

A. Collier Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso, 1994)

M. Archer Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (CUP, 1995)

P. Manicas A Realist Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge University Press 2006).

Danermark, B. et al Exoplaning Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences (Routledge 2002).#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

For criticisms of ‘Critical Realism’ in social science see:

A. King ‘The Impossibility of Naturalism: The Antinomies of Bhaskar’s Realism’ Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 29 (3) 1999

D. Layder The Realist Image in Social Science (Macmillan, 1990) 

R. Albury, G. Payne, W. Suchting ‘Naturalism and the Human Sciences’ Economy and Society 10(3) 1981

 

‘Critical realism’ has had considerable impact in economics. See, for example:

T. Lawson Economics and Reality (Routledge, 1997)

 

And in geography. See:

A. Sayer ‘Realism and geography’ in R.J. Johnston (ed) The Future of Geography (Methuen, 1985)

A.C. Pratt ‘Putting critical realism to work: the practical implications for geographical research’ Progress in Human Geography 19(1) 1995

 

For many (though not all) realists Marxism (and especially its Althusserian variant) provides exemplars of ‘explanatory mechanisms’ of social structures. See:

L. Althusser ‘Contradiction and overdetermination’ in For Marx (Allen Lane, 1969)

L. Althusser ‘From Capital to Marx’s philosophy’ in L. Althusser, E. Balibar Reading Capital (New Left Books, 1970)

T. Benton The Rise and Fall of Structuralism Marxism (Macmillan, 1984) 

T. Benton Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) Ch 8, 9

R. Keat, J. Urry Social Theory as Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) Ch 6

 

On issues of 'realism' in literary interpretation and literary method, see the essays in:

G.E. Levine (ed) Realism and Representation: Essays on the Problem of Realism in Relation to Science, Literature, and Culture (U of Wisconsin Press, 1993)

G. Potter The Bet: Truth in Science, Literature and Everyday Knowledges (Aldgate, 1999).

Habermas and realism see

J. Habermas ‘Realism after the linguistic-pragmatic turn’ in Delanty and Strydom

 

Topic 4:  Interpretative Social Science: Hermeneutics and Phenomenology 

In this session we discuss interpretive accounts of social science, which attempt to clearly distinguish it from natural science.  Defenders of an interpretive approach argue that the key difference is that whereas natural science studies a domain of objects which has no intrinsic meaning, social science studies a domain of objects in which the meanings and understandings of actors play a central part. The major attempt is that found in Max Weber’s methodological writings and in the work of Alfred Schutz who took up and developed Weber’s approach. This session will offer a detailed examination of Weber’s and Schutz’s conception of value relevance, of the distinction between value-judgements and validity in sociological accounts, and of the ‘ideal typical’ nature of theory construction. For Peter Winch, an important interpretive thinker, this means that social inquiry must focus on grasping the understandings of actors, rather than explaining their behaviour in a causal, scientific fashion.  This session discusses both Winch’s views, and the views of critics who argues that it is possible to incorporate a concern with actors’ meanings while still allowing that there are causes operating in the social world.  Some of the issues raised are illustrated with reference to Lupton and Tulloch’s argument for an interpretive approach to theorizing fear of crime.  #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Core texts:

Max Weber ‘ “Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy” ’

Alfred Schutz ‘Concept and theory Formation in the Social Sciences’. 

 

Peter Winch The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, 2nd Edition (Routledge, 1990) Ch 2, 3. 

 

Anthony Giddens ‘Social Science as a Double Hermeneutic’ 

 

(These are in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings. In the case of Winch see the extract ‘Philosophy and Science’).

 

Discussion and application:

D. Lupton & J. Tulloch: ‘Theorizing fear of crime: beyond the rational/irrational opposition’, British Journal of Sociology, 1999, Vol 50, No 3

 

B. Flyvbjerg ‘The Power of Example’ in Making Social Science Matter (Cambridge University Press, 2001)

 

Seminar Questions:

 

1. Why does Schutz disagree with the neopositivists Hempel and Nagel?

 

2. Are ideal types a useful research tool?  

 

3. What is Winch’s position on the relation of social scientists’ understandings to the understandings of actors?  Is this a defensible view?

 

4. Are cases studies scientific?

 

Further reading:

Other relevant methodological essays by Weber are:

M. Weber ‘The meaning of “ethical neutrality” in sociology and economics’ in M. Weber The Methodology of the Social Sciences (Free Press, 1949)

M. Weber Roscher and Knies: the Logical Problems of Historical Economics (Free Press, 1975)

On the ‘politics’ of social inquiry, see:

M. Weber ‘Science as a vocation’ in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948)

M. Weber ‘Politics as a vocation’ in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948)

[an important and very influential essay on Weber’s stance is: A. Gouldner ‘Anti-Minotaur: the myth of a value-free sociology’ in For Sociology (Allen Lane,

1973)]

 

Two excellent detailed treatment of Weber’s methodological arguments are:

H.H. Bruun Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber’s Methodology (Munksgaard, 1972)#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

S. Kalberg Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology (Polity Press, 1994)

 

A ‘classic’ and still important critique of ideal types is:

T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action (Free Press, 1937) Ch XVI

 

More straightforward secondary accounts are:

F. Parkin Max Weber (Tavistock, 1982) Ch.1

J. Torrance 'Max Weber: methods and the man' Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 15(1) 1974

A. Sharlin ‘Max Weber and the origin of value-free sociology’ Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 15(2), 1974

G. Roth 'Sociological typology and historical explanation' in R. Bendix, G. Roth Scholarship and Partisanship (Univ. of California Press, 1971)

W. Mommsen 'Ideal type and pure type: two variants of Max Weber's ideal-typical method' in The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber (Polity, 1989)

M. Albrow Max Weber’s Construction of Social Theory (Macmillan, 1990)

 

Weber’s approach is frequently contrasted with that of Durkheim’s ‘positivist’, or ‘structuralist’ accounts (usually - not always, see Turner - to the latter’s disadvantage):

R. Bendix 'Two sociological traditions' in R. Bendix, G. Roth Scholarship and Partisanship (Univ. of California Press, 1971)

S. Turner The Search for a Methodology of Social Science: Durkheim, Weber and the Nineteenth Century Problem of Cause, Probability and Action (Reidel, 1986)

 

See also

D. Papineau ‘Ideal types and empirical theories’ British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 27(2), 1976

B. Fay Social Theory and Political Practice (Allen and Unwin, 1972), Ch 4

 

For a strong, revisionist and ‘hermeneutic’ defence of Weber against any attempt to reconcile science and social inquiry, see:

W. Hennis '"A Science of Man": Max Weber and the political economy of the German

Historical School' in Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction (Allen & Unwin, 1988)

L. Scaff ‘Weber before Weberian Sociology’ in K. Tribe (ed) Reading Weber (Routledge, 1989)

 

On the problem of ‘decisionism’ in Weber’s separation of scientific judgements from judgements of value, see:

J. Habermas ‘Technology and science as “ideology”’ Toward a Rational Society (Heineman, 1971)

K-O. Apel ‘The common presuppositions of hermeneutics and ethics: types of rationality beyond science and technology’  Research into Phenomenology IX(1), 1979

 

For a feminist appropriation of Weber’s methodology of ideal types, see:

S.J. Hekman ‘Truth and method: feminist standpoint theory revisited’ Signs 22(2), 1997

 

A few good collections of readings covering the diversity of approaches under the general heading are:

F. Dallmayr and T McCarthy (eds) Understanding and Inquiry (University of Notre Dame, 1977)

A. Giddens (ed) Positivism and Sociology (Heinemann, 1975)

T. Luckmann (ed) Phenomenology and Sociology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978). 

S. C. Brown Philosophical Disputes in the Social Science (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979) 

P. Rabinow and Sullivan (eds) Interpretative Social Science (Berkeley: University of California, 1979).

 

Good general treatments of 'hermeneutics' or 'interpretative' social inquiry are:

W. Outhwaite Understanding Social Life: the Method Called Verstehen (Allen and Unwin, 1975) Chs 2,5, 6

W. Outhwaite New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory (Macmillan, 1987) Chs 4, 5

R. J. Bernstein The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Blackwell, 1976) Part II

See also:

R. Keat, J. Urry Social Theory as Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975) Chs 7,8,9

T. Benton The Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) Chs 6,7

A. Giddens New Rules of Sociological Method (Hutchinson, 1976) Ch 1

H. Ferguson Phenomenological Sociology: Experience and Insight in Modern Society (Sage 2006).

 

Winch's Wittgensteinian critique of social science is in:

P. Winch The Idea of a Social Science (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976)

 

On the convergence between hermeneutics and Wittgensteinian approaches, written by a proponent of critical hermeneutics, see:

K-O Apel The Analytical Philosophy of Language and the Gesiteswissenschaften (Reidel, 1967)

K-O. Apel Towards a Transformation of Philosophy (Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1980)

 

On the conservatism of interpretation, see:

J. Habermas 'On systematically distorted communication' Inquiry 13(3), 1970 [see, 

also: 

J. Habermas  'Towards a theory of communicative competence' Inquiry 13(4), 1970]

 

For a reply, see:

H-G Gadamer 'On the scope and function of reflection' in Philosophical Hermeneutics (U of California Press, 1976)

B. Fay Critical Social Science (Polity, 1987) Chs 7, 8.

 

The standard 'positivist' critique of interpretation is:

T. Abel 'The operation called verstehen' American Journal of Sociology 54, 1948.

 

Topic 5:  New Histories of Science: Kuhn and Foucault#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

The session deals with conceptions of science that arose out of new histories of science. We take two examples that have been particularly influential in shaping post-positivistic social science: Kuhn and Foucault who both in quite different ways saw scientific inquiry as organized into discourses or, to use Kuhn’s term, paradigms qand counter paradigms. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolution opened up new ways of thinking about science that led to the recognition of social factors entering into science, which he saw as organized into paradigms. Paradigms determine what counts as evidence and what is relevant. Foucault in a different but related way demonstrated the historically embedded nature of science showing how scientific knowledge is embedded in discourses that shift accordingly as major epistemic ruptures occur. The most influential methodological approach that has emerged from Foucault is that of genealogy and a social theory of governmentality. Some applications of these will be discussed. 

 

Core text:

Thomas Kuhn ‘Introduction: A Role for History’ 

 

Michel Foucault ‘The Order of Things’ 

 

Michel Foucault ‘Power/Knowledge’ 

 

(these are in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings).

 

Discussion and application:

N. Polsby (1998) ‘Social Science and Scientific Change: A Note on T. Kuhn’s Contribution’ Annual Review of Political Science 1: 199-210

 

(This can be downloaded from the library).

 

Nicholas Rose (with Paul Rabinow)  ‘Biopower today: Vital Politics: Health, Medicine and Bioeconomics into the Twenty First Century, London School of Economics, 5-7 September 2003. Available on the internet

 

Seminar Questions:

1. Compare the notions of paradign and discourse as used by Kuhn and Foucault

 

2. How relevant is the notion of paradigm for the social sciences? 

 

3. What is the meaning of ‘genealogy’ as used by Foucault? What does Foucault mean by ‘subjugated knowledges’?

 

Further Reading:

On Kuhn:

T.S. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (U of Chicago Press, 1962)

T.S. Kuhn 'The natural and the human sciences' in D.R. Hiley (et al) The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture (Cornell UP, 1991)

B. Barnes T.S. Kuhn and Social Science (Macmillan, 1982)

Bird, A. 2009. Thomas Kuhn. London: Acumen.

S. Fuller Thomas Kuhn – A Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago University Press, 2000)#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

W. Sharrock, and R. Read Kuhn – Philosopher of Scientific Revolution (Polity Press, 2002).

T. Nickles (ed) Thomas Kuhn (Cambridge University Press 2003).

 

On Foucault:

 

H. Dreyfus and R. Rabinow (eds) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (University of Chicago Press, 1982).

D. Hoy (ed) Foucault: A Critical Reader (Blackwell, 1986)

G. Gutting (ed) The Cambridge Compansion to Foucault (Cambridge University Press, 1994)

On Foucault and Habermas, see:

M. Kelly (ed) Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate. (MIT Press, 1994).

Foucault, M. (1979) ‘Governmentality’ Ideology  & Consciousness, 6, pp. 5-21.

 

             Dean, M (1994)  Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical    

             Sociology London: Routledge

             Dean, M. 1999 Govermentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage

             Kendall, G. And Wicham, G. 1999 Using Foucault’s Methods. London: Sage.

             Rose, N. 1999 Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge University 

             Press.

             Scheurich, J.1997 Research Method in the Postmodern London: Falmer Press

            Michel-Foucault.com website: http://www.michel-foucault.com/

 

On postmodernism in social science

D. Harvey The Condition of Postmodernity (Blackwell, 1989)

F. Jameson, F. Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 

 (Duke University Press, 1991)

For some general surveys of postmodernism in social science see:

G. Delanty Modernity and Postmodernity(Sage, 2000)

B. Smart Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies (Routledge, 1992)

B. Turner (ed) Modernity and Postmodernity (Sage, 1990)

D. R. Dickens and A. Fontana (eds) Postmodernism and Social Enquiry (UCL Press, 1994)

 

 

Topic 6: Social Contructionism and Discourse Theory

This topic concerns an approach that has diverse origins but can be principlally related to developments with interpretative social science. We look at Berger and Luckman’s book The Social Construction of Reality, which arose out of the phenomenological tradition, and stronger versions of constructionism such as Actor Network Theory, as in the work of Latour. Our main focus will be the notion of discourse which has emerged out of social contructionism and has become an important methodological approach in social research today. #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Core texts:

Ian Hacking ‘What is Social Constructionism?’

 

(Hacking is in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings).

 

Discussion and applications:

M. Haijer ‘Discourse Analysis’ in The Politics of Environmental Discourse (Oxford University Press. 1995)

 

Benford, R. and Snow, D. (2000) ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An 

Overview and Assessment’ Annual Review of Sociology, 26: 611-37.

 

Gamson, W. and Stuart, D. (1992) ‘Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest: The Bomb in Political Cartoons’, Sociological Forum 7 (1): 55-86

 

(the latter two can be downloaded from the library. The chapter by Haijer will be distributed).

 

Further Reading:

General works on constructivism including some applications:

Eder, K. (1996) The Social Construction of Nature. London Sage

Fuller, S. (1994) ‘The Reflexive politics of constructionism’ History of the Human Sciences 7(1): 87-93

Gamson, W. (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Presss.

Gergin, K. (2001) Social Construction in Context. London: Sage

Gergin, K. (1994) Realities and Relationships: Soundings in Social Construction. Cambridge: Cambridge, MIT/

Gergin, M. and Gergin, K. (eds) (2003) Social Construction: A Reader. London: Sage

Goffman, E. (1986) Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Boston: Northeastern University.

Hacking, I. (1999) The Social Construction of What? Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Hannigan, D. (1995) Environmental Sociology: A Social Constructionist Perspective. London : Routledge.

Kukla, A. (2000) Social Constructionism and the Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge.

Sismondo, S. (1993) ‘Some social constructions’ Social Studies of Science, 23: 515-53.

Strydom,  P. (2002) Risk, Environment and Society. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Williams, R. and Velody, I. (eds) (1998) The Politics of Constructionism. London: Sage.

 

On Discourse analysis:

Van Dijk, T. (1985) Handbook of Discourse Analysis New York: Academic Press.

Wodak, R. & Chilton, P. A. (Eds.) (2005) A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse

Analysis. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

 

See also Max Miller (1992) ‘Discourse and Morality’, European Journal of Sociology 

33(1): 3-38

 

Topic 7: Critical Social Science: Critical Theory

This session will discuss the idea that social scientific investigation should adopt a critical perspective.  Social science as critique and emancipatory practice is the focus, with reference to Marx and Western Marxism and the critical theory tradition. Fay and Harvey argue that the purpose of critical social science is to develop knowledge that can be used to challenge and overthrow existing forms of social organisation.  Their arguments are contrasted with those of Hammersley, who argues that partisan social research is problematic, and that researchers should aim to be value-free in their studies.  We will explore whether a critical orientation should be a presupposition of inquiry, or whether it should only arise once inquiry has concluded that there are good reasons to be critical of present social arrangements.#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Core texts:

Horkheimer ‘Critical and Traditional Theory’ 

Adorno ‘Sociology and Empirical Knowledge’ 

Jurgen Habermas ‘Knowledge and Human Interests’ 

Jurgen Habermas ‘The Tasks of a Critical Theory’ 

(all in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings).

James Bohman ‘Critical Theory as practical Knowledge: Participants, Observers and Critics’ in S. Turner and P. Roth Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Blackwell, 2003).

 

Discussion and application:

Jürgen Habermas (2006) ‘Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research’, Communication Theory 16: 411-26.

B. Fay Critical Social Science (Polity, 1987) Ch 2

L. Harvey Critical Social Research (Unwin Hyman, 1990) Ch 1

M. Hammersley Taking Sides in Social Research: Essays on Partisanship and Bias (Routledge, 2000) Ch 1 

(Copies will be made available)

Honneth ‘An Interview with Axel Honneth: The Role of Sociology in the Theory of Recognition’ European Journal of Social Theory 5 (2): 263-77

Axel Honneth (2004) ‘Organized Self-Realization: Some Paradoxes of Individualization’, European Journal of Social Theory 7(4): 463-78. 

 

Seminar Questions:

 

1. What are some characteristics of critical thinking?

 

2. In what ways, according to Habermas, is knowledge based on ‘human interests’?

 

3. How convincing are the arguments of Harvey and Fay for a critical orientation to social research?

 

4. Is it possible for social scientific research to be value-free? 

 

5. Do Hammersley’s arguments undermine the positions of Harvey and Fay?  How might they respond?

 

6. Which features of social life might a critical account misconstrue?

 

Further Reading:

On the background to contemporary critical theory, see:

M. Jay The Dialectical Imagination (Heinemann, 1973)

D. Held Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Hutchinson, 1980)

P. Connerton (ed) Critical Sociology (Penguin, 1976) is a useful anthology of some of the older texts

D. Couzens Hoy and T. McCarthy Critical Theory (Blackwell, 1997)

 

A classic empirical application of critical theory:

Adorno, T. et al (1982) The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Norton).

 

There is an extensive literature on Habermas. See, especially, the following:

T. McCarthy The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Hutchison, 1978)

R. Geuss The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (C.U.P. 1981)

R. Keat The Politics of Social Theory: Habermas, Freud and the Critique of Positivism (Blackwell, 1984)

W. Outhwaite Habermas: A Critical Introduction (Polity, 1994)

G.Finlayson Habermas: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2005)

G. Delanty Social Theory in a Changing World (Polity, 1999).

 

The most extensive statement of Habermas's position in relation to Marxist accounts of capitalism is:

J. Habermas Legitimation Crisis (Heinemann, 1976)

 

For a discussion, see:

D. Held 'Crisis tendencies, legitimation and the state' in D. Held and J. Thompson (eds) Habermas: Critical Debates (Macmillan, 1982)

 

Habermas makes extensive use of the sociological distinction between 'system integration' and 'social integration', developed by Lockwood. See:

D. Lockwood 'System integration and social integration' reprinted as an appendix to Solidarity and Schism: 'The Problem of Disorder' in Durkheimian and Marxist Sociology (Clarendon Press, 1992)

 

For Gadamer's critique of critical theory, see:

H-G Gadamer 'Rhetoric, hermeneutics and the critique of ideology' in K. Mueller-Vollmer (ed) The Hermeneutics Reader (Blackwell, 1986)

 

For a feminist critique of Habermas, see:

N. Fraser 'What's critical about critical theory? The case of Habermas and gender' in S.

Benhabib, D. Cornell (eds) Feminism as Critique (Polity, 1987) Also in N. Fraser Unruly Practices B (U of Minnesota Press, 1989)

 

For feminist discussions of Marxist 'exemplars' for critical theory, see:

N. Hartsock 'The feminist standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism' in S. Harding (ed.) Feminism and Methodology (Open Univ. Press, 1987)

M. O'Brien 'Reproducing Marxist man' in L. Clark, L. Lange (ed.) The Sexism of Social and Political Theory: Women and Reproduction from Plato to Nietzsche (Univ. of Toronto Press, 1979)

H. Hartmann 'The unhappy marriage of Marxism and Feminism' in L. Sargent (ed) TheUnhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism (Pluto, 1981)#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

On objectivity see 

 

Graham, K (2002) ‘The ideal of objectivity in political dialogue: liberal and feminist approaches’  Social Epistemology.  16  3  295-309.

Hammersley, M(2011) ‘Objectivity: a reconceptualisation’ in Williams, M and Vogt, W P (eds)The Sage Handbook of Innovation in Social Research Harding, S. (1986) The Science Question in Feminism. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Harding, S. (1991) Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Harding, S. (1993) ‘What is ‘Strong Objectivity’? In L. Alcoff and E. Potter (eds), Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge).

Janack, M (2002) ‘Dilemmas of Objectivity’  Social Epistemology 16 3 267-281.

Methods. London: Sage 25- 43.

Longino, H (1990) Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Longino, H (1996) ‘Subjects, Power and Knowledge: Prescription and Description in Feminist Philosophies of Science’ in Fox Keller, E and Longino, H (eds) Feminism and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

 

Topic 8:  Critical and Pragmatic Social Science

The focus of this session is on developments in critical social science that have emerged out of the work of Pierre Bourdieu. We begin with a look at some of Bourdieu’s main methodological ideas – in particular the notions of practice and reflexivity - and then contrast his approach with the more recent developments around pragmatic sociology as in the work of Boltanski and Thevenot. 

 

Core Texts:

Pierre Bourdieu ‘Radical Doubt’  (in Delanty and Strydom eds,  Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic and Contemporary Readings).

 

L. Boltanski and L. Thevenot (1999) ‘The Sociology of Critical Capacity’ European Journal of Social Theory 2 (359-77)

 

Discussion and Applications

M. Lamont and Thevenot, L. (2000) Rethinking Comparative Sociology. Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press. Introduction.

 

Seminar questions:

1. What is the aim of a reflexive sociology, according to Bourdieu?

2. How useful is the notion of practice as a methodological tool?

3. What is critical capacity?

 

Further Reading:

Some of Bourdieu’s methodological ideas can be found in:

P. Bourdieu  The Logic of Practice (Polity Press, 1990)#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

P. Bourdieu Sociology in Question (Sage, 1995)

P. Bourdieu  'Toward a Reflexive Sociology'. In Turner, S. (ed.) Social Theory and Sociology: The Classics and Beyond.  (Blackwell, 1996).

 

A good methodological introduction to his work is

P. Bourdieu and L. Wacquant  An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992)

 

On Boltanski and Thevenot

 

Boltanski, L. and Thevenot, L (2006) On Justification: Economies of Worth. Princton University Press.

 

Chiapelo, E. and Thevenot, L. (2005) The New Spirit of Capitalism London: Verso.

 

See P. Wagner (1999) ‘After Justification: Repertoires of Evaluation and the Sociology of Modernity’ European Journal of Social Theory 2: 341-57

 

T. Benatuoil (1999) ‘A Tale of Two Sociologies: The Critical and Pragmatic Stances’ European Journal of Social Theory 2: 379-91.

 

E. Chiapelo (2003) ‘Reconcilling the two Principal Meaning of the Notion of Ideology: The Example of the “Spirit of Capitalism” ’ European Journal of Social Theory 6: 155-171.

 

F. Silber (2003) ‘Pragmatic Sociology as Cultural Sociology: Beyond Repertoire Theory’, European Journal of Social Theory 6 (4): 427-449.

 

Thevenot, L. (2001) ‘Organized Complexity: Conventions of Coordination and the Composition of Economic Arrangements’ European Journal of Social Theory 4 (4): 405-25

 

Thevenot, L. (2007) ‘A Science of Life Together in the World’ European Journal of Social Theory 10 (2): 233-44

 

Topic 9: Feminism: Social inquiry reconstructed or de-constructed?

 

In this session, we will use debates in feminist epistemology to re-assess some of the different arguments addressed in the course. On the one hand, feminism has been a major stimulus to the reconstruction of social science and the questioning of mainstream social science as 'male-stream'. On the other hand, feminists have also expressed their suspicion at the deconstruction of 'reason' as male. The session will be organised in terms of debates over 'feminist empiricism', 'standpoint theory', 'postmodern feminism' and black/majority world feminism. We will look at the question, to be taken up further next week, of who has the right to speak: are only women able to interpret the social condition of other women, as some standpoint theorists argue, or is there no such thing as authentic experience as postmodern feminists such as Joan Scott claim? In what way too have black and majority world feminists criticised the universalising tendency of western feminisms to speak about women as united and homogeneous? #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

Core Reading:核心閱讀：

 

S. Harding The Science Question in Feminism (Open Univ. Press, 1986) - Ch.6

 

E. Grosz  'What is feminist theory?' in C. Pateman, E. Gross (eds.) Feminist Challenges (Allen and Unwin, 1986)

 

M. Hawkesworth (1989) 'Knower, knowing, known: feminist theory and claims of truth' Signs 14(3): 533-57.

J.W. Scott (1992) ‘Experience’, in J. Butler and J. Scott (eds.), Feminists Theorize the Political. New York and London: Routledge.

C.T. Mohanty (2002) ‘”Under Western Eyes” Revisited: Feminist solidarity through anticapitalist struggles’, Signs 28 (2): 499-533.

 

L. Stanley (1993) ‘The Knowing Because Experiencing Subject: Narratives, lives, autobiographies’, Women’s Studies International Forum 16(3): 205-215.

 

Seminar Questions:

 

1. Which of the accounts of feminist knowledge do you find most convincing: feminist empiricism, feminist standpoint, or postmodern feminism?  Why?

 

2. To what extent can social scientific research be independent of political values and influences?

 

3. Does Smith’s research project gain anything from her adoption of a feminist standpoint perspective?  Does it lose anything?

 

Further Reading:深入閱讀：

 

On the feminist critique of the 'universalistic' discourse of science, see:

S. Harding Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Ch 5 

E.F. Keller  (1982) 'Feminism and science' Signs 11(3) 

S. Bordo (1986) 'The Cartesian masculinization of thought' Signs 11(3),. [the last two articles are available in, S. Harding, J. O'Barr (eds) Sex and Scientific Inquiry 

(U. of Chicago Press, 1987)

K.P. Addelson 'The man of professional wisdom' in S. Harding, M.B. Hintikka (eds.)

Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Reidel, 1983)

 

See also:

A. Phillips 'Universal pretensions in political thought' in M. Barrett, A. Philips (eds.)

Destabilising Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates (Polity, 1992)

C. MacKinnon Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard UP, 1989) esp, Ch 6

 

On feminist standpoint theory, see:

A. Jaggar Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Rowman and Littlefield, 1988) Ch 11#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

N. Hartsock 'The feminist standpoint: developing the ground for a specifically feminist historical materialism' in S. Harding (ed.) Feminism and Methodology OUP, 1987)

D. Smith The Everyday World as Problematic (Open UP, 1988) Chs 1, 2.

 

For a critique using Weberian methodology of ideal types, see:

S.J. Hekman (1997) ‘Truth and method: feminist standpoint theory revisited’ Signs 22(2), (and comments by Harding, Smith, Hartsock in the same issue)

 

On the 'generalisation' of 'marginal' identities in the opposition to 'white, male, middle-class' theory, see: 

S. Harding (1992) 'Subjectivity, experience and knowledge: an epistemology from/for rainbow coalition politics' in J.N. Peterse (ed) Emancipations, Modern and Postmodern (Sage)

C. Lemert (1994) 'Dark thoughts about the self' in C. Calhoun (ed) Social Theory and the Politics of Identity (Blackwell)

L. Nicholson 'On the postmodern barricades: feminism, politics and theory' in S.A. Seidman, D.G. Wagner (eds.) Postmodernism and Social Theory (Blackwell, 1992)

D. Haraway (1990) 'A manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology, and socialist feminism in the 1980s' in L. Nicholson (ed.) Feminism/Postmodernism (Routledge)

 

For a critique of epistemological privilege to any group, see:

B-A. Bar On (1993) 'Marginality and epistemic privilege' in L. Alcoff, E. Potter (eds) Feminist Epistemologies (Routledge)

 

On postmodern feminism, see:

S. Hekman (1990) Gender and Knowledge Ch 5

A. Yeatman (1995) 'Postmodern epistemological politics and social science' in K. Lennon, M. Whitford (eds.) Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology (Routledge, 1995)

L. J. Nicholson (1990) (ed.) Feminism/ Postmodernism (Routledge). Esp., essays in Part I 

 

 

For an argument that the 'crisis in reason' should be exacerbated, see:

E. Grosz (1993) 'Bodies and knowledges: feminism and the crisis of reason' in L. Alcoff, E. Potter (eds). Feminist Epistemologies (Routledge)

 

For criticisms of postmodern feminism, see:

I. Barwell (1995) 'Towards a defence of objectivity' in K. Lennon, M. Whitford (eds.) Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology (Routledge, 1995)

S. Strickland (1995) 'Feminism, postmodernism and difference' K. Lennon, M. Whitford (eds.) Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology (Routledge)

G. McLennan 'Feminism, epistemology and postmodernism' Sociology 29(3) 1995

 

For a defence of 'feminist empiricism', see:#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

L. H. Nelson 'Feminist epistemological communities' in L. Alcoff, E. Potter (eds) Feminist Epistemologies (Routledge, 1993)

J. Holmwood  (1995) 'Feminism and epistemology: what kind of successor science?' Sociology 29(3).

 

Topic 10: Feminist methodology and questions relating to studying the ‘other’

 

In what ways can some of the epistemological issues and problems noted in last week’s topic be overcome through the introduction of reflexive and autobiographical research methodologies? Is there such as thing as a ‘feminist’ research method? If so, to what extent can it embrace and progress feminist knowledge claims, interests and ethics? To what extent has the attempt by different groups to develop their own methodological approaches been successful? Are methodological approaches designed to collect and analyse quantitative data ‘masculine’ and so anti-thetical to true feminist enquiry? Are approaches that adopt a participatory, qualitative approach automatically more likely to result in research findings that take due cognisance of women’s experiences and lives? Are they less likely to make participants feel objectified by the research process? Can we collect viable or significant data from groups we don’t belong to or identify with? Is politicised method more or less likely to produce ‘reliable’ or relevant evidence for social scientific enquiry?

 

Core Reading:核心閱讀：

 

A. Oakley (X) ‘Interviewing women: a contradiction in terms’ in Y.S. Lincoln, K. N. Denzin (eds.) Turning Points in Qualitative Research: Tying Knots in a Handkerchief (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press).

 

A. Oakley (2000) Experiments in Knowing: Gender and Method in the Social Sciences (Polity)

 

S. Hacker (1990) Doing it the Hard Way: Investigations of Gender and Technology (Boston: Unwin Hyman).

 

N. Westmarland (2001) ‘The Quantitative/Qualitative Debate and Feminist Research: A Subjective View of Objectivity’ Forum for Qualitative Social Reseach Volume 2, No. 1, Art.

 

C. Ramazanoglu with J. Holland (2003) Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices (Sage Publications: London)

C. Ramazanoglu (1992). ‘On feminist methodology: male reason versus female empowerment’. Sociology, 26(2): 207-212.

 

P. Lather (1986) ‘Issues of Validity in Openly Ideological

Research: Between a Rock and a Soft Place ‘ Interchange, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Winter 1986): 63-84.

 

Seminar Questions:

 

1. What are the principle features of research that is typed as ‘feminist’? How are the related to other forms of social scientific research?#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

 

2. What ethical issues are at stake in doing research on/with ‘Other’ groups? Who has a ‘right’ to speak on behalf of whom?

 

3. Do qualitative methods lend themselves to feminist research, or researching disadvantaged groups? If so, why?

 

Further reading:

 

Race research:

L. Back and J. Solomos (2001) ‘Doing Research, Writing Politics: The dilemmas of political intervention in research on racism’, in H. Goulbourne, Race and Ethnicity: Critical concepts in sociology Volume III. London: Routledge.

 

More on the feminist research process:

L. Stanley & S. Wise (1983). ‘Back into the personal or: our attempt to construct feminist research’. In G. Bowles & R. Duelli Klein (Eds.), Theories of women's studies (pp.20-60). (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).

L. Stanley & S. Wise (1990). ‘Method, methodology and epistemology in feminist research processes’. In L. Stanley (Ed.), Feminist praxis (pp.20-60). (London: Routledge)

 

A. McRobbie (1982). The politics of feminist research: between talk, text and action. Feminist Review, 12, 46-57.

More on quantitative research and its relationship to feminism:

A. Hunt (1986). ‘Use of quantitative methods in researching issues which affect women’ Methodological Issues in Gender Research, 10: 12-19.

 

Appendix 1  General Transdisciplinary Theoretical Frameworks in the Philosophy of Social Science

Naturalistic Interpretative   Critical

Epistemological                                     

foundations and philosophical traditions                                 

Positivism Neopositivism Deduction

Nomological-deductive       Induction/

observation based

Probalistic

Predictive 

Principle of falsification      Explanation                       Hermeneutics Phenomenology 

Symbolic interactionism 

Social constructionism Induction

Intepretation    Understanding of beliefs, intentions,  symbols, meaning                         #p#分頁標(biāo)題#e# Marxism

Feminism Postcolonialism

Pragmatism

Mediation

Dialectics

Abduction

Diagnostic

Reconstructive

World-disclosure

Theory and practice linked

Major representatives         Popper, Hempel, Nagel           Weber, Schutz, Mead

Rational choice, Taylor, Geertz           Marx, Freud,Adorno,                                                                                                                                   

Foucault, Bourdieu                                                                                                                              Habermas, critical realism

Ontological Assumptions Social reality as objective given Reality as inter-subjective, linguistic Structured, power relations, Emergent, 

Theory of Society                 Macro (large-scale social processes) Micro (small group situations)                       Meso (social conflict, movements, change)

Methodological approaches   Functionalism 

Middle range theory  

 

Measurement, measurable facts

Search for regularities/social laws                 Ideal types, Constructionism                   Discourse theory Narrative theory Frame analysis

Performative theory

Thick description Ideology critique

Social, cultural critique

Deconstruction

Anti-oppressive practice, critical practice

Research methods                   Quantitative 

Fact finding

Surveys

Questionaires

Comparative                           Qualitative Case study, interviews

Participant observation                                                                                                                                                                                   Focus groups

Content/media analysis, Documentary

Ethnography

Quantitative

Qualitative

Action theory

Normative (political ethical) approaches         Neutral, universalistic

Policy relevant       Neutral, relativist                      

Emancipation, enlightenment, anti-systemic

                                                                                                      

                                                      Appendix 2 Assessment  

 

Assessment: 4,000 word term paper. 

Write an essay on one of the following topics:

 

1. Critically compare and contrast two major philosophies of social science and discuss how they lead to different methods of analysis

2. In what ways is social research influenced by ontological and epistemological assumptions?#p#分頁標(biāo)題#e#

3. Discuss some problems in establishing objectivity in social science

4. Does social science offer explanations or interpretations of social phenomena?

5. What does it mean to say social scientific knowledge is a form of social critique?

6. Can society be studied in an ethically and or politically neutral way?

 

Length: The essay should be about 4,000 words in length (this does not include additional material: the bibliography/References, notes etc). As a guide, the overall paper should not exceed 5000 words.

 

Format:格式
 

It should take the format of:

Title (one of the above)

Abstract (optional)

Text (ideally with a structure of Introduction, 3-4 titled subsections, conclusion, References)

Use the Harvard referencing system (author/date in text and full list of cited references under References).

 

Submission deadline  Please see your 'Assessment Deadlines and Exam Timetable' in Sussex Direct for the submission deadline and location. It is your responsibility to know when and where you should submit your work. Late submission will be penalised unless acceptable mitigating evidence is also submitted.

 

Essay Plans征文計(jì)劃
 

You can send me by email a plan for the essay (rough outline, up to 100 words or so) and I will provide some comments. You cannot send a draft of the essay. There is no particular deadline but please do so no later than 16th December.

 

It is recommended not to write the essay until after the module, or close to the end.